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   n May 2018, sixteen months after taking office, UN Secretary-General An-
tonio Guterres launched his global disarmament agenda, designating dis-
armament as a core priority of his tenure.1 The agenda, which is set out under 
four thematic strands in the publication Securing Our Common Future: An 
Agenda for Disarmament,2 comprises a template of immediate and long-term 
ambitions. They include the elimination of nuclear weapons, ensuring re-
spect for norms against chemical and biological weapons, mitigating the im-
pact of conventional arms, combatting the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons, maintaining human control of weapons and artificial intelligence, 
ensuring legal compliance in cyberspace, and resuscitating the multilateral 
disarmament processes and institutions. Notwithstanding the repeated ref-
erences to “disarmament,” many of the ambitions set out in the publication 
are concerned with ensuring that weapons are held, used, and developed in 
full compliance with international law rather than with the reduction or the 
elimination of weapons systems per se, save weapons of mass destruction. 
The agenda is presented in the shape of a “non-paper,” understood in the 
corridors of power as a discussion paper divorced from and not intended to 
form part of the official business of the United Nations. The language oscil-
lates between a utopian ambition, captured by the reference to “general and 
complete disarmament,” and a realism conveyed through a vernacular that 
is technical, legal, and scientific, if only to stay credible in this domain where 
State sovereignty is preeminent. Whether it is meant as a peace offering, a 
reminder, a provocation, or a combination thereof, on the cover of the non-
paper is a single paper crane.    
Guterres is not the first secretary-general to prioritize disarmament. 
However, he is the first to emphasize the need for the greater involvement 
of women in the field of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation 
diplomacy. The proportion of women participating in multilateral forums 
has increased in recent years. Yet, among State delegations, women remain 
 
1. Antonio Guterres, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the University of Geneva on 
the Launch of the Disarmament Agenda (May 24, 2018), https://www.un.org/sg/en/con-
tent/sg/speeches/2018-05-24/launch-disarmament-agenda-remarks.  
2. U.N. OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, SECURING OUR COMMON FUTURE: AN 














underrepresented, most notably at senior decision-making levels.3 Notwith-
standing their absence in the formal structures of power, women have en-
gaged actively with disarmament for over a century, albeit often as actors 
located on the periphery. Women’s activism in this field is a rich and com-
plex one. It is, however, not a history that is generally familiar to those out-
side the world of feminist activism and scholarship. This article provides me 
with an opportunity to tell that story and how women have sought to over-
come exclusion, marginalization, and silencing in both policy and law in pur-
suit of what I describe as a transformative disarmament agenda. In other 
words, this article is concerned not only with women’s political activism and 
the struggle for equal participation in disarmament circles, critical though it 
is. What I also seek to demonstrate are the ways in which feminist thinkers 
have worked to reposition and reframe the disarmament discourse and chal-
lenge mainstream thinking on and around weapons and disarmament by 
probing established assumptions and generating critical analyses in order to 
provide new solutions to old problems.   
To surface this history at this moment in time seems warranted. After 
all, crises should present the opportunity for critical self-reflection and 
change.4 Existing approaches appear to have delivered little progress. The 
latest world military expenditure is estimated to have been US$1,917 billion 
in 2019—3.6 percent higher than in 2018.5 This figure represents the fifth 
consecutive annual increase and the largest of the decade 2010–2019. Over 
the last eighteen months the normative regimes governing nuclear arms con-
trol and non-proliferation have taken a serious battering and, meanwhile, the 
global arms industry has recorded unprecedented sales.6   
This article is divided into four sections. In Part II, I present an account 
of women’s early activism in the field of disarmament against the backdrop 
of inter-State efforts to advance disarmament through multilateral fora. I 
 
3. RENATA HESSMANN DALAQUA, KJØLV EGELAND & TORBJØRN GRAFF HUGO, 
STILL BEHIND THE CURVE: GENDER BALANCE IN ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION 
AND DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (2019). 
4. Louise Arimatsu & Rasha Obaid, In Times of Crisis, LSE (June 9, 2020), 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/06/09/in-times-of-crisis/. 
5. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK 
2020: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ch. 8 (Military Ex-
penditure), https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/08.  
6. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Global Arms Industry: Sales by the 













trace the strategies adopted by feminist peace activists7 to overcome legal 
and political barriers in order to shape the content and trajectory of inter-
State disarmament efforts, including through the League of Nations. In Part 
III, I turn my attention to feminist disarmament activism in the post-war 
period, which has been shaped by two fundamental changes, normative and 
material. The adoption of the UN Charter and the advent of nuclear weap-
ons have each had profound consequences on how multilateral disarmament 
has subsequently been pursued and conceptualized. Feminist activism 
evolved in response to these contextual changes, but, to the extent that legal 
equality has not translated into de facto equality, women’s voices have largely 
been marginalized or entirely dismissed in the gendered field of weapons and 
disarmament. This latter point is further elaborated in Part IV, where I turn 
to feminist scholarship which has sought to conceptually reposition disarma-
ment discussions, revealing how gendered norms, identities, and the struc-
tures of power operate to block disarmament efforts.8 Common to this 
scholarship is the view that while transforming gender norms and relations 
alone is unlikely to advance disarmament efforts, without such change, there 
is little possibility that any meaningful progress can be achieved. Building on 
these insights, I conclude this article in Part V with some tentative thoughts 
on the future of disarmament, including in the context of the Security Coun-
cil’s Women, Peace and Security agenda, and reflect on whether international 
 
7. There is no single “feminist” position on war, weapons, or disarmament. Women, 
nor for that matter feminists, are not a homogenous group. In this article I focus on the 
tradition of feminist activism that has always been opposed to war-making (and the creation 
of war systems) and war-fighting as a collective social practice. Not all have necessarily sub-
scribed to pacifism, although there is a strong tendency to reject violence as a means for 
resolving disagreement. I use the terms “feminist peace activism,” “feminist anti-milita-
rism,” and “anti-war feminism” interchangeably to denote this tradition of feminists. For 
further elaboration, see Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, in ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: RELIGIOUS AND SEC-
ULAR PERSPECTIVES (Steven P. Lee & Sohail H. Hasmi eds., 2002); Claire Duncanson & 
Catherine Eschle, Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Govern-
ment’s White Paper on Trident, 30 NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE 545 (2008).  
8. Although this article introduces a distinction between activism and scholarship, there 
is often little that separates the two. As with Marxism and anti-racist postcolonial critiques, 
feminism is an explicitly political commitment which goes beyond theoretical critique. To 
borrow from Gramsci, I regard feminism as a philosophy of praxis and share Otto’s view 
that “activism is a form of critique, and critique – even academic critique – is a form of 
activism.” Dianne Otto, Beyond Stories of Victory and Danger: Resisting Feminism’s Amenability to 
Serving Security Council Politics, in RETHINKING PEACEKEEPING, GENDER EQUALITY AND 











law, reimagined, can more effectively advance disarmament in an age of in-
creasing military spending, rising global tensions, and a noticeable lack of 




“. . . as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my 
country is the whole world” 
Virginia Woolf, 193810 
 
As is well-documented, the idea of the international fora as a site for advancing 
consensual disarmament among States, first proposed by Czar Nicholas II 
in 1898,11 was initially met with skepticism in capitals around the world.12 
The realists of the day regarded Nicholas II’s appeal, which framed disarma-
ment as a precondition to securing inter-State peace, as a cynical political strat-
egy motivated by the desire to end the then ongoing arms race and develop-
ment of new weapons and new means of delivering them, spheres in which 
Russia was trailing.13 By contrast, the proposal was widely welcomed by the 
 
9. The declaration adopted by States to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of 
the United Nations, contained a single terse and almost meaningless reference to disarma-
ment that “international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and 
their architectures need to be upheld.” G.A. Res. 75/1, ¶ 9 (Sept. 28, 2020).  
10. VIRGINIA WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 197 (1943).  
11. The Czar’s rescript, sent to the Great Powers of the day, opens with the declaration 
that “the maintenance of general peace, and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments 
which weigh upon all nations, present themselves in the existing condition of the whole 
world, as the ideal towards which the endeavors of all Governments should be directed.” It 
continues,  
 
the Imperial Government thinks that the present moment would be very favorable for seek-
ing, by means of international discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peoples 
the benefits of a real and durable peace and, above all, of putting an end to the progressive 
development of the present armaments. 
 
For the full text of the rescript, see Peace Conference at The Hague 1899:  
Rescript of the Russian Emperor, August 24 1898, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale. 
edu/19th_century/hag99-01.asp (last visited May 21, 2021).  
12. For an account of some of the reaction among capitals and within civil society to 
the Czar’s proposal, see Daniel Hucker, British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting 
the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, 26 DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 405 (2015).  
13. But see Hucker, who notes how the Czar’s proposal was very much influenced by 












European and US-based transnational peace movements, which had long 
been calling for the reduction in arms as a necessary condition to peace on 
the grounds that excessive levels of weapons increased the tendency of States 
to resort to military force as the primary instrument of statecraft.14 Peace 
activists had further argued that disarmament was desirable on social justice 
grounds since resources could be redirected to human needs and away from 
unproductive military purposes. Although the peace movements were dom-
inated by men, many women had also joined, not least because such collec-
tives offered a potential platform through which they could express their 
opinions on political issues of the day in light of their legal exclusion from 
the formal structures of power.15  
By the opening of the 1899 Hague Peace (and Disarmament) Confer-
ence, and following intensive negotiations among States, two additional mat-
ters for deliberation had been added to the agenda: the regulation of warfare 
and the use of arbitration to resolve disputes.16 As peace activist Bertha von 
 
who believe in war [for they] are wasting the resources of civilisation” making disarmament 
necessary. Id. at 408. For a more comprehensive assessment of the factors that influenced 
the Czar’s decision, see John Mack, Nicholas II and the Rescript for Peace of 1898: Apostle of Peace 
or Shrewd Politician?, 31 RUSSIAN HISTORY 83 (2004). Mack suggests that a close reading of 
the rescript indicates that Nicholas was not calling for disarmament but only a halt to the 
arms race. The arms race must be seen within the broader context of imperialist expansion 
and the advent of the industrial revolution which, by the mid-nineteenth century, was trans-
forming the technologies of modern industry (civilian and military), the means and methods 
of warfare, weapons development, the production of military hardware, and the relationship 
between private industry and the State. See, e.g., William H. McNeill, The Industrialization of 
War, 8 REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 203 (1982).   
14. There is now a considerable body of literature on the emergence of the peace move-
ments that were very much part of the political landscape in late nineteenth century Europe 
and North America. See, e.g., PETER BROCK, PIONEERS OF THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM 
(1968); SANDI E. COOPER, PATRIOTIC PACIFISM: WAGING WAR ON WAR IN EUROPE 1815-
1914 (1991); ROGER CHICKERING, IMPERIAL GERMANY AND A WORLD WITHOUT WAR: 
THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND GERMAN SOCIETY 1882-1914 (1975); HELOISE BROWN, THE 
TRUEST FORM OF PATRIOTISM: PACIFIST FEMINISM IN BRITAIN, 1870-1902 (2018). Critical 
scholars have been careful to register the different philosophical traditions, origins, and pri-
orities of these movements, which did not always share common objectives, nor for that 
matter strategies.  
15. The right to vote was extended to all adult men decades before it was to women. 
In Britain, for example, full suffrage was not recognized until 1928, in France not until after 
WWII, and in Switzerland not until the 1970s. 
16. For the Russian circular of January 11, 1899, see Peace Conference at The Hague 1899: 
Russian Circular January 11, 1899, AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_cen-












Suttner would later remark, the introduction of questions concerning “mili-
tary customs and the humanizing of war into the deliberations of the Peace 
Conference” was a “wedge . . . calculated to rob [the conference] of its indi-
vidual character.”17 Even before the opening of the Conference, it was clear 
that States had little intention to advance disarmament. This fact was tellingly 
captured by the view expressed by even Russia’s delegate to the Conference, 
Feodor de Martens, that “the Utopians, the most dangerous enemies of the 
progress of international law, expected from this Conference a general dis-
armament of all the Powers, eternal peace and the abolition of war.”18   
Chief amongst the “utopians” were the women peace activists and, most 
notably, the Women’s League for International Disarmament (Ligue des 
Femmes pour le Désarmement International) which delivered to the delegates a 
petition, with over half a million signatures, in support of disarmament. This 
“remarkable feat,” as Sandi Cooper notes, was largely ignored by the male 
 
was amended to reflect the exchanges among states. For a discussion of the amended text, 
see 2 BERTHA VON SUTTNER, MEMOIRS OF BERTHA VON SUTTNER: THE RECORDS OF AN 
EVENTFUL LIFE 227–28 (1910).  
17. VON SUTTNER, supra note 16, 228–29. As von Suttner notes, “when the text of the 
second circular is compared with the first, it can be seen how much water had been poured 
into the fiery wine that was first offered to the world.” Id.  
18. Feodor de Martens, International Arbitration and the Peace Conference at The Hague, 169 
THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 604 (July 1, 1899). This view was not uncommon among 
the participating delegates. For example, in preparation for the conference Britain’s War 
Office sought to demonstrate how “increased armaments enhanced the prospects of peace 
and lessened the horrors of war.” More specifically, the War Office concluded that “it is not 
desirable that any undertaking should be given restricting the numbers or the cost of Her 
Majesty’s Military Forces”; “it is not desirable to agree to any restrictions upon the employ-
ment of further developments in destructive agencies, whether in small arms, cannon, or 
explosives; or the methods of employing them”; and, finally, “it is not desirable to assent to 
an international code on the laws and customs of war.” Draft of Instructions for Peace 
Conference 1899 (on file with The National Archives, Kew, Sir John Ardagh Papers, Man-
uscript Collections, PRO 30/40/15) (emphasis added). Likewise, as forcefully argued by US 
representative Richmond Hobson,  
 
the proposition for universal disarmament at the present time flies into the face of the most 
fundamental law of life and its advocacy can only harm the cause of peace for which it professes 
allegiance. It is preposterous to advocate disarmament until some effective substitute for arma-
ments is offered as a means of national self-preservation.  
 
Richmond Pearson Hobson, Disarmament, 2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 











peace community which had cautioned against pressing for disarmament.19 
In fact, in the run-up to the Conference, the male-dominated leadership of 
the established peace movements had decided to direct their efforts not to 
disarmament but to the establishment of an international arbitration mecha-
nism, a core institutional element of a Kantian inspired new global order 
founded on a then-nascent field of international law.20 This strategic reposi-
tioning may have aligned more closely with the priorities of the major powers 
but it did little to deter feminist peace activists from actively pressing for 
disarmament as a necessary element of a broader strategy to secure inter-
State peace. An international arbitration mechanism was essential to prevent 
conflict, they reasoned, but not at the expense of delaying disarmament. 
Moreover, for many women, the primary sources of insecurity were those 
they confronted daily in the shape of economic and social insecurity. The 
increasing expenditure on weapons, justified by the State as advancing secu-
rity, did not reflect their lived experience. The permanent war economy and 
the diversion of resources from human needs to unproductive military pur-
poses was not only an anathema, but founded on a fiction that did not cor-
respond to their reality.  
The 1899 Conference was a huge disappointment for women activists 
and especially for those who—often at huge personal cost, financially and 
socially—had gathered in The Hague seeking opportunities to influence the 
delegates during the two months of negotiations.21 With the exception of a 
 
19. Sandi Cooper, French Feminists and Pacifism, 1889-1914: The Evolution of New Visions, 
36 PEACE & CHANGE 5, 13 (2011). The position taken on disarmament by the mainstream 
peace movements of the day appears to be far more equivocal than commonly acknowl-
edged. As Cooper’s scholarship reveals, in 1893 Frederic Passy, spokesman for the French 
pacifist movement, stated “disarmament was obviously the distant aim of our efforts, the 
moment had not come to ask for it . . . to make what would appear to be an attack on the 
army or what could be interpreted as a weakening of discipline, was totally contrary to our 
method.” Id. at 13. 
20. According to Cooper, when the Women’s League for International Disarmament 
(Ligue des Femmes pour le Desarmement International) was first established in 1896, Passy had 
strongly advised against using the word “disarmament.” Id. at 13–14. See also Hucker, supra 
note 12, at 411, who describes the British government’s antipathy towards disarmament in 
the run up to the conference as “not entirely out of step with the ambitions of peace enthu-
siasts”).  
21. What is often forgotten is that in contrast to the official delegates, whose attendance 
was supported by public funds, many of the women were reliant on private financial support 











handful of high-profile figures,22 most of the women found themselves con-
signed to the margins, doubly excluded, as peace activists and as women. 
Political activism was not a new experience for many. Notwithstanding their 
exclusion from the formal political fora, women had long been active in var-
ious overlapping social movements throughout the nineteenth century, hav-
ing recognized that political influence could be wielded through collective 
action. As Laure Bereni and Anne Revillard observe, the ideology of the sep-
arate spheres of public and private was 
  
shaken during the nineteenth century by the growing and multifaceted en-
gagement of women in collective action, usually organized both among 
women and as women [and] it was within the gap between public and pri-
vate, in the space of social, religious, or civic commitments where their 
presence was tolerated, that women became active.23 
  
By the late nineteenth century, women-led organizations had mush-
roomed to also focus on issues that were of particular concern to women, 
such as the status of married women, women’s nationality, women’s working 
conditions, child welfare, and trafficking, thus filling the voids. Many women 
had also joined mainstream peace movements but, when they found them-
selves being marginalized within these movements, which were replicating 
and reproducing the same patterns of exclusion practiced by the State, 
women began to form their own peace organizations.24   
This break enabled women peace activists to subscribe to a far broader 
internationalist agenda and to pursue a more radical strategic outlook than 
 
22. Foremost among those present was peace activist and journalist, Bertha von Sutt-
ner. According to Levenson, von Suttner’s residence “became a meeting point for diplomats 
and leading members of the peace movement” during the 1899 Peace Conference. Alan T. 
Levenson, Theodor Herzl and Bertha von Suttner: Criticism, Collaboration and Utopianism, 15 JOUR-
NAL OF ISRAELI HISTORY 213, 222 (1994).  
23. Laure Bereni & Anne Revillard, Un Movement Social Paradigmatique? [A Paradigmatic 
Social Movement?], 85 SOCIÉTÉ CONTEMPORAINES 17, 21 (2012). 
24. Leading peace activist Carrie Chapman Catt is reported to have described the es-
tablished peace societies as “very masculine in their point of view” and “have as little use 
for women . . . as have the militarists.” Quoted in Lina Schott, The Woman’s Peace Party and the 
Moral Basis for Women’s Pacifism, 8 JOURNAL OF WOMEN STUDIES 18, 24 (1985). This pattern 
of marginalization was not unique to the peace movements but replicated in all mainstream 
social movements, including those dedicated to labor. It was not uncommon for women to 
be excluded or denied access to decision-making positions within trade unions, reinforcing 
the inequalities confronted by women in the workforce. Geert Van Goethem, An Interna-
tional Experiment of Women Workers: The International Federation of Working Women 1919-1924, 











their male counterparts.25 In particular, progressive feminists called for 
greater attention to be paid to the gendered social cost of the arms race and, 
through sophisticated critiques of imperialism, militarism, and women’s op-
pression, urged that the links between social and international justice be fully 
recognized.26 Thus, the convening of the 1899 Conference signalled a pivotal 
moment for women’s peace activism: women began to shape their own dis-
tinct feminist agenda over the question of disarmament.  
As for the Conference itself, insofar as general arms reduction was con-
cerned, little was achieved by States save for the adoption of a voeu (or a 
statement of future hopes) which called for further study on the technical 
challenges of limiting specific weapons and the general problem of limiting 
armed forces or military budgets.27 That said, the Conference paved the way 
for the emergence of a wholly new model of civil society engagement in the 
shaping of international policy and law, a fact that did not go unnoticed by 
feminist peace activists of the day.28 
 
25. For example, the women’s peace groups were far more critical of the colonial wars 
being waged by their own governments than their male contemporaries. Eliza Riedi, The 
Women Pro-Boers: Gender, Peace and the Critique of Empire in the South African War, 86 HISTORI-
CAL RESEARCH 92 (2013). French feminist pacifists, too, were outspoken in their criticism 
of Britain’s part in the Boer War, in sharp contrast to the male-led peace societies that were 
far more reluctant to engage in public condemnation given France’s own colonial history. 
Cooper, supra note 19, at 14.    
26. HELOISE BROWN, THE TRUEST FORM OF PATRIOTISM: PACIFIST FEMINISM IN 
BRITAIN, 1870-1902 (2003). See generally Cooper, supra note 19. Some of the early feminist 
work cited by Cooper would inform the writing and thinking of leading feminist peace ac-
tivist Jane Addams. For example, in Newer Ideals of Peace, Addams exposes how militarism is 
deeply embedded in everyday culture. JANE ADDAMS, NEWER IDEALS OF PEACE (1907). 
27. The only agreement reached on disarmament was that “the restriction of military 
charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the 
increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind.” DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, at 233 (1920). While Geoffrey 
Best describes the conference as a “misnomer,” more recent academic literature suggests 
that the conferences did contribute to paving the way for disarmament negotiations in sub-
sequent years. Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague 
Conference and What Came After, 75 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 619, 631 (1999); George Al-
drich & Christine Chinkin, A Century of Achievement and Unfinished Work, 94 AMERICAN JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (2000).  
28. In the run-up to the conference, the leaders of the peace movements had captured 
the public’s imagination and, consequently, were able to exert some influence both within 
and outside government. James Tryon, The Rise of the Peace Movement, 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL 












Between 1899 and the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, ex-
penditure on armaments by most States increased. Motivated by the prohib-
itive costs of the arms race, coupled with increasing public pressure for dis-
armament, it was Britain, rather than Russia,29 which pressed for a second 
conference and the opportunity to revisit the question of disarmament.30  
Yet, even before the final invitations to the conference had been issued, and 
certainly by the time “the most eminent men of [the participating] coun-
tries”31 had gathered in The Hague, the political elites were aware that the 
proposal for a limitation of armaments was “moribund.”32 Disarmament re-
mained on the agenda, although little time was accorded to the topic. As 
Scott Andrew Keefer notes, “statesmen could appease pacifistic and econ-
omy-minded domestic constituencies and return from the Netherlands hav-
ing at least tried to reduce expenditure on armaments.”33 A somewhat bitter 
 
force is ever wielded by civil society. Although the delegates for the most part saw civil 
society as a “distraction,” they soon recognized that public opinion could provide a useful 
tool in the process of treaty negotiations. David D. Caron, War and International Adjudication: 
Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 
(2000). On the peace movements as the precursors to the international non-governmental 
organizations that exist today, see MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER 
TO WAR 87 (2003).  
29. As Keefer suggests, having lost its navy in the 1904–05 war with Japan, it was not 
in the strategic interests of Russia to engage in any exchanges that would risk limiting its 
ability to rebuild its military capabilities. Scott Andrew Keefer, Building the Palace of Peace: The 
Hague Conference of 1907 and Arms Control before the World War, 9 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 35, 39 (2007).  
30. The vast majority of European States had little interest in returning to discuss dis-
armament. For a useful analysis on the domestic political factors that shaped disarmament 
policies among the military powers during this period, see generally id. By contrast, in Brit-
ain, the Liberals had come to power on an electoral promise to cut military expenditure, 
which in turn raised public expectations. Daniel Hucker, Our Expectations Were Perhaps Too 
High: Disarmament, Citizen Activism and the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, 44 PEACE & CHANGE 
10 (2019). During the intervening years, both the British prime minister and US president 
had spoken publicly in favor of disarmament, raising expectations among the general public. 
Hamilton Holt, The United States Peace Commission, 192 THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 301, 
308 (1910).  
31. Opening Address by M. Nelidow, the Russian Ambassador and President of the 
1907 Conference, 1 DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL PEACE, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, THE 
CONFERENCE OF 1907, at 47 (1920). 
32. MERZE TATE, THE DISARMAMENT ILLUSION: THE MOVEMENT FOR A LIMITATION 
OF ARMAMENTS TO 1907, at 327 (1942). 











paradox for the peace activists was that the lasting legacy of the 1907 Con-
ference came in the shape of the progressive development of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) with the adoption of the Hague conventions that 
sought to humanize warfare. Moreover, the decision by States to focus on 
the prohibition of specific weapons was to pave the way for a fragmented 
approach to be established and normalized at the expense of a more ambi-
tious program of general disarmament. Once again, the only agreement 
reached on disarmament was the reaffirmation of the voeu of 1899, namely, 
“for governments to undertake again the serious examination of this ques-
tion.”   
With the outbreak of World War I in July 1914, the Third Hague Con-
ference, scheduled to be convened in 1915, was canceled. However, war did 
not stop over a thousand feminist peace activists from belligerent and neutral 
States from gathering there between April 28 and May 1, despite official re-
sistance and at enormous personal cost.34 Most of the women had met be-
fore through the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (the primary 
sponsors of the conference) and recognized the strategic value of coordinat-
ing internationally.35 The resolutions adopted by the women after four days 
of deliberation have been described as “visionary” by scholars, not least for 
their appeal to international law. The principles and goals identified in the 
resolutions foreshadowed the normative and institutional developments that 
 
34. Delegates from one German city were subsequently prosecuted for treason and 
incarcerated for having attended the 1915 peace congress. JANE ADDAMS, PEACE AND 
BREAD IN TIME OF WAR 15 (1922). Addams recounts how, on return, many of the women 
experienced angry abuse and ridicule and were depicted as cowards and ostracized by their 
own communities, not only for their pacifist ideals but as women for failing to conform to 
gender stereotypes. For accounts of the 1915 conference and WILPF’s early history, see 
HARRIET HYMAN ALONSO, PEACE AS A WOMEN’S ISSUE: A HISTORY OF THE US MOVE-
MENT FOR WORLD PEACE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS ch. 3 (1993); LEILA J. RUPP, WORLD OF 
WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT ch. 2 (1997); 
MELINDA PLASTAS, A BAND OF NOBLE WOMEN: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE WOMEN’S 
PEACE MOVEMENT (2011); Mary K. Meyer, The Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom: Organizing Women for Peace in the War System, in GENDER POLITICS IN GLOBAL GOV-
ERNANCE (Mary Meyer & Elisabeth Prugl eds., 1999). 
35. The conference was chaired by Jane Addams of the newly formed US-based 
Woman’s Peace Party which was established in early 1915 in response to an appeal by peace 
activists Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence from the United Kingdom and Rosika Schwimmer 
from Hungary to US women who were protesting against the war in Europe. With the out-
break of war in Europe, women in the United States formed several organizations, including 
the Union Against Militarism and the Woman’s Peace Party. In later years Addams would 
co-found the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advance-











would be embraced by States over the following century, including, for ex-
ample, respect for the territorial integrity of States; the right to self-determi-
nation; the creation of a permanent international conference and a perma-
nent International Court of Justice; a system of pacific settlement of dis-
putes; and the enfranchisement of women.36 The “Women and War” reso-
lution, the first of many on the topic that would subsequently be adopted by 
the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), ex-
pressly drew attention to the different and disproportionate impact of con-
flict on women, thereby laying the conceptual foundations for a gendered 
understanding of war and peace.37 Insofar as disarmament was concerned, 
the activists were unambiguous in advocating for “universal disarmament.”38     
Many of the proposals were subsequently integrated into Wilson’s Four-
teen Points, bar the call for universal disarmament and equality. The latter, 
it was deemed, was a matter governed by domestic, not international, law.39 
 
36. WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
WOMEN 14 (1915), https://ia800306.us.archive.org/15/items/internatcongrewom00inter-
ich/internatcongrewom00interich.pdf [hereinafter 1915 CONGRESS REPORT]. For a detailed 
account of the proceedings, see INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S COMMITTEE FOR PERMANENT 
PEACE, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN REPORT (1915), https://ia803101.us.ar-
chive.org/29/items/berichtrapportre45wome/berichtrapportre45wome.pdf. Jane Addams 
personally met with President Wilson after the Congress. Wilson incorporated many of her 
recommendations into his Fourteen Points speech. For full text of Wilson’s speech, see 
Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, The Fourteen Points, Speech to Congress 
(Jan. 8, 1918), AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp.  
37. The recognition that women experienced war differently and that they were often 
disproportionally adversely affected was vividly captured by Emily Hobhouse. See EMILY 
HOBHOUSE, THE BRUNT OF WAR AND WHERE IT FELL (1902).  
38. As a first step to securing that end, the resolution called for an international agree-
ment to “take over the manufacture of arms and munitions of war” and “control all inter-
national traffic in the same” on the basis that “the private profits accruing from the great 
armament factories [was] a powerful hindrance to the abolition of war.” 1915 CONGRESS 
REPORT, supra note 36, at 14. In its inaugural meeting in January 1915, the Woman’s Peace 
Party likewise called for “the nationalization of arms manufacture” but rather than universal 
disarmament advocated for the “limitation of armaments.” WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY, YEAR 
BOOK OF THE WOMAN’S PEACE PARTY (1916). In its resolution the Woman’s Peace Party 
further called for “organized opposition to militarism; education of youth in the ideals of 
peace; the extension of the suffrage to women; the substitution of law for war.” ADDAMS, 
PEACE AND BREAD, supra 34, at 7.   
39. The political classes continued to insist that equality was a matter governed by do-
mestic, not international law. As leading feminist peace activist, Rosika Schwimmer com-
mented on the outbreak of war, “if there is a clear conscience among our women that they 












On disarmament, rather than universal, what Wilson proposed was the reduc-
tion in national armaments “to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
safety,” a phrasing that continues to be used to this day notwithstanding its 
ambiguity. Nevertheless, disarmament was once more placed squarely on the 
international agenda reinforced by the popular belief—and importantly one 
that was shared by some within States—that the arms race had created inse-
curity, thereby making war inevitable.40 
This reasoning was incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles, which re-
quired, as a first step, the disarmament of Germany “to render possible the 
initiation of a general limitation of armament of all nations.”41 The weight 
accorded to disarmament was further entrenched by entrusting the League 
of Nations, founded with the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles, with the 
task of advancing international disarmament as its principal aim. Article 8 of 
the League’s Covenant, the first operative article, expressly recognized that 
“the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to 
the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by com-
mon action of international obligations” and set out a blueprint for action to 
that effect, including a requirement for the League’s Council to address the 
issue of the manufacture of arms by private enterprise.42 In the early years, 
 
feeling that they have been frightfully wronged while their hands were tied by a refusal of 
rights.” Beth S. Wenger, Radical Politics in a Reactionary Age: The Unmaking of Rosika Schwimmer, 
1914-1930, 2 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S HISTORY 66, 70 (1990). 
40. For example, a decade after leaving his post as British Foreign Secretary in 1916, 
Sir Edward Grey would write, “the enormous growth of armaments in Europe, the sense 
of insecurity and fear caused by them—it was these that made war inevitable.” 1 VISCOUNT 
GREY OF FALLODON, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: 1892-1916, at 90 (1925). 
41. Treaty of Versailles pt. V, June 28, 1919, 3 U.S.T. 3714, 225 C.T.S. 189.  
42. Article 8 continues:  
 
 The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each 
State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the sev-
eral Governments. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every 
ten years.  
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of 
armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.  
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of mu-
nitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how 
the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had 
to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the 












significant efforts were directed towards addressing these latter goals as well 
as with prohibiting chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.43 How-
ever, steps to advance the far more ambitious objective of reducing “national 
armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety” were deferred 
until 1926. 
Excluded from the official proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, 
but undeterred, the women of WILPF convened their second conference in 
Zurich in 1919.44 The fact of exclusion would be turned on its head as a 
strategic advantage. By convening parallel transnational gatherings, feminist 
peace activists could ensure the airing of alternative perspectives through a 
public platform and concurrently strengthen bonds within their own organ-
izations and consolidate relations with other women’s movements that were 
similarly excluded.45 Moreover, unencumbered by the constraints imposed 
 
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to 
the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of 
such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes. 
 
League of Nations Covenant art. 8. In addition, Articles 22 and 23 required the League to 
take measures to regulate the global arms trade. 
43. These efforts would culminate in the adoption of the Protocol for the Prohibition 
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Meth-
ods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975).  
44. For details of the proceedings, see WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE 
AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN, ZURICH, MAY 
12 TO 17, 1919 (1919) [hereinafter 2ND CONGRESS REPORT].    
45. Also excluded from Versailles were women who had been active in the labor move-
ment prior to the war. As with the feminist peace activists, feminist labor activists formed 
their own organization—the International Congress of Working Women—and in October 
1919 convened a conference in Washington, D.C. to run in parallel to the first conference 
held by the newly established International Labour Organisation, which had been created 
by the Versailles Treaty. In her address to the delegates, Mary van Kleeck expressed an 
indignation that was shared by all feminist activists of the period:  
 
Women have had no direct part in writing the terms of the [1919] Peace Treaty. It is a man-
made peace. Women have had no direct share in the labor charter of the treaty. The agenda 
of the coming [ILO] conference, with its emphasis on the protection of women rather than 
the participation of women in plans to protect themselves and others, is significant of the 
attitude of men, even in the labor movement, toward the industrial position of women. . . . 
[W]e have yet to win the right to a wage based on precisely the same considerations that 













by domestic politics and a State-centric framework defined by national secu-
rity, feminist peace activists were better placed to unite over a more progres-
sive internationalist agenda. WILPF was hugely critical of terms of the Ver-
sailles Treaty for adopting a differentiated approach to disarmament—one 
that was enforced and immediate for the vanquished, and consensual and 
prospective for the victors—which, it was maintained, was not a tenable ba-
sis upon which to secure a sustainable peace.46 Instead, activists called for an 
“immediate reduction of armaments [by all States] on the same terms for all 
 
Mary van Kleeck, Address at the First Convention of International Conference of Working 
Women, The Task of Working Women in the International Congress (Oct. 28, 1919). See 
First Convention of International Conference of Working Women, Washington, DC, 33 
(Oct. 28, 1919) (on file with the Mary van Kleeck Papers, 1883–1972, Sophia Smith Collec-
tion, Women’s History Archive, Smith College Library, Box 71, Folder 10). See also Christine 
Chinkin, 100 Years of Peace Activism: Linking the International Labour Organisation with the WPS 
Agenda, LSE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/12/16/100-years-of-
peace-activism-linking-the-international-labour-organisation-with-the-wps-agenda/.  
46. On receipt of an advance copy of the peace treaty, WILPF adopted a series of 
resolutions condemning the terms imposed, including on the grounds that “by the demand 
for the disarmament of one set of belligerents only, the principle of justice is violated and 
the rule of force is continued.” The resolution also expressed  
 
deep regret that the Terms of the Peace proposed at Versailles should so seriously violate 
the principles upon which alone a just and lasting peace can be secured, and which the 
democracies of the world had come to accept. By guaranteeing the fruits of the secret trea-
ties to the conquerors, the Terms of Peace tacitly sanction secret diplomacy, deny the prin-
ciples of self-determination, recognize the right of the victors to the spoils of war, and create 
all over Europe discords and animosities, which can only lead to future wars. 
 
2ND CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 44. WILPF was the first international body to issue a 
considered criticism of the Covenant of the League of Nations, although other transnational 
women’s organizations were equally critical of the Versailles Treaty. In Peace and Bread in 
Time of War, Addams writes:  
 
In planning a congress of women it was borne in mind that the official Conference at the 
end of the war determining the terms of peace would be largely composed of diplomats 
who are necessarily bound by the traditional conventions which have so long dominated all 
intercourse between nations. Because in every country such men are seldom representative 
of modern social thought and the least responsive to changing ideas, it was considered su-
premely important that when the conference of diplomats should come together, other 
groups should convene in order to urge the importance of certain interests which have 
hitherto been inarticulate in international affairs. This need had been recognized not only 
by the women but by international organizations of labor, by the Zionists and similar 
groups, who were also planning to hold Congresses at the same time and in the same place 
as the official Peace Conference After the War. 
  











member-states”47 and urged States to go beyond the terms of the Covenant 
and commit to “total disarmament (land, sea, air).”48 Dissatisfied with only 
holding States to account, and recognizing that the arms industry consisted 
of a partnership between public and private sectors, WILPF also resolved, 
once the League was operational, to press it “to appoint an International 
Commission, to sit in public, with power to take evidence on oath and to 
command the attendance of any witness it may desire to call, to enquire into 
the fact regarding profit-making due to war and preparation for war.”49    
The creation of the League marked a key development for international 
feminist activism. Targeted lobbying by women’s groups during the Paris 
Conference had resulted in the inclusion of a non-discrimination provision 
giving them an institutional foothold. Article 7 of the League of Nations 
Covenant expressly provided for the representation of women by stating that 
“all positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secre-
tariat, shall be open equally to men and women.” Although women delegates 
were typically appointed to committees that were concerned with issues such 
as social welfare and children’s protection, the very existence of the League, 
which was tasked with progressing disarmament, meant that multiple oppor-
tunities were created for collective interventions by feminist activists operat-
ing within and from outside the institution.50 The inter-war years saw femi-
nist peace activists coalesce around two objectives: universal disarmament 
and the regulation of the private arms trade.51 Although disarmament was a 
core priority for WILPF, it was not the only women’s organization pressing 
for universal and total disarmament during this period. For example, follow-
ing the United States’ announcement in 1921 of its intention to host a Lim-
itation of Armaments conference “to bring about an all around reduction in 
 
47. 2ND CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 44, at 244. 
48. Id. at 245. 
49. Id. at 254. 
50. See, in particular, the assessment by Catherine Marshall of the significance of the 
inclusion of women into the formal structures of the League. WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL 
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 
OF WOMEN 64–68 (1921) [hereinafter 3RD CONGRESS REPORT].   
51. For example, in 1924 WILPF adopted an amended constitution reaffirming as one 
of its four core objectives “complete and universal disarmament on land, on sea, and in the 
air, [and] for the abolition . . . of the prostitution of science for destructive purposes.” 
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE FOURTH 
CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM 56 











naval and if possible other armaments,”52 the International Federation of 
Working Women, representing forty-eight nations, unanimously adopted a 
resolution supporting “a policy of total disarmament” and urged participat-
ing States to “take steps toward the immediate disarmament of the Na-
tions.”53 Disarmament, it was reasoned, was necessary if the risk of war was 
to be averted.54 Moreover, increases in military expenditure could not be jus-
tified against the backdrop of rising unemployment and poverty.55 Feminist 
activists were acutely aware of the divergence between their stated aims and 
the far less ambitious program being crafted by States.56 Although WILPF 
 
52. As made clear by President Harding’s invitation, which read: “the enormous dis-
bursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the en-
cumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity,” the United States was motivated by 
the desire to avert the looming arms race in the Pacific, as were the other participating States. 
Conference on Limitation of Armament, President’s Invitation to Powers, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 1, 1 (1922). 
53. International Federation of Working Women, Resolution on Disarmament, Second 
International Congress (1921).  
54. In her address to the International Congress of Working Women, President of the 
National Women’s Trade Union League of America, Margaret Dreier Robins, stated, “The 
first tasks of the working women of the world, to which we here stand dedicated, is to make 
war against war. The first battle in that war is to stop increasing armaments. Armaments 
breed war.” Margaret Dreier Robins, President of the National Women’s Trade Union 
League of America, Address at the International Congress of Working Women Meeting, 
Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 17, 1921).  
55. For example, the resolution adopted in June 1921 by the National Women’s Trade 
Union League (US) notes that,  
 
the hunger, suffering and misery of the people of the world following the tragedy of the 
Great War, challenges the intelligent leadership of mankind with this supreme opportunity 
to liberate humanity from the crushing burden and menace of increasing armaments . . . 
and . . . the present programs for increasing armaments are not only economically intolera-
ble but also continue the terror and panic of the peoples of the world, delaying reconstruc-
tion and preventing an effective peace. 
  
International Congress of Working Women, Bulletin No. 11, July-Aug. 1921 (on file in the 
Mary van Kleeck Papers, 1883–1972, Sophia Smith Collection, Women’s History Archive, 
Smith College Library, Box 72, Folder 4).     
56. See, for example, Gertrude Baer’s call to the delegates at the Second Congress of 
the International Federation of Working Women that, “the limitation of armaments is noth-
ing; let it be ‘Total disarmament or nothing.’” International Federation of Working Women, 
Second International Conference (1921). Not all feminist collectives urged for universal dis-
armament, some preferring to support a strategy to limit/reduce military expenditure. For 
example, the resolution adopted by the National Women’s Trade Union League (US) in 












would welcome the proposed naval conference “as a step in the direction” 
to universal total disarmament, its National sections were encouraged to 
“emphatically and continuously insist upon the original meaning of the term 
‘disarmament’ in its literal sense, thus preventing the use of the term as a 
camouflage for ‘reduction of armaments.’”57 The optimistic assessment by 
States of what had been achieved with the adoption of the 1922 Washington 
Naval Treaty58 was certainly not shared by feminist peace activists who, for 
the most part, regarded the treaty as “a disappointment.”59 The widening 
chasm between feminist expectations of disarmament—understood as uni-
versal and total—and the outcome of treaty negotiations that were deliver-
ing, at most, a reduction or limitation of certain classes of weapons and 
weapons systems remained a huge source of frustration for activists. 
To exert greater pressure on the political class to commit to a far more 
extensive program of disarmament, the inter-war period saw the piloting of 
multiple transnational strategies by feminist activists, including the system-
atic collection of data for the purposes of targeted political lobbying;60 the 
 
“to a limitation of armaments” and urged President Harding “to invite Great Britain and 
Japan to a Conference to arrange a limitation of naval armaments by agreement.” Robins, 
supra note 54. 
57. 3RD CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 50, at 121–22.  
58. Following the conclusion of the treaty, the report of the American delegation con-
cluded,  
 
It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately an enormous saving of money and the 
lifting of a heavy and unnecessary burden. The treaty absolutely stops the race in competi-
tion in naval armament. At the same time it leaves the relative security of the great naval 
powers unimpaired. No national interest has been sacrificed; a wasteful production of un-
necessary armament has been ended. 
 
Report of the American Delegation submitted to the President, February 9, 1922, Limitation of Arma-
ment, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 257, 278 (1922). The assessment proved over-op-
timistic in that loopholes in the treaty text were to lead to two further rounds of inter-State 
negotiations in 1927 and 1930. These conferences on naval arms limitation were not held 
under the auspices of the League of Nations. For the full text of the 1921 conference, see 
CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS (NOVEMBER 12, 1921 TO FEBRUARY 
6, 1922) (1922), https://ia600207.us.archive.org/19/items/conferenceonlimi00cana/con-
ferenceonlimi00cana.pdf. 
59. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 56. 
60. For example, WILPF sections across the world were tasked with documenting the 
obstacles to disarmament confronted by activists in their respective countries as well as the 
barriers to tackling militarism in order to provide the leadership with the tools for exerting 












expansion of self-education programs;61 and the promotion of public educa-
tion initiatives62 coupled with targeted interventions and campaigns around 
international events and conferences on disarmament.63 In particular, femi-
nist activists fully appreciated the importance of being recognized as experts 
in the field of weapons and weapons systems if they were to be heard in 
mainstream discussions on disarmament and the regulation of the arms 
trade. In 1924 WILPF urged sections “to investigate the development of 
chemical warfare and its special dangers and to organize opposition, both to 
end it and as a means of educating the masses as to the real character of war 
in general”64 and invited their members, Gertrud Woker, Naima Sahlbom, 
and Ester Akesson-Beskow to form the International Committee Against 
 
WILPF’s lobbying power was significant. According to Plastas, WILPF’s Dorothy Detzer 
was one of the most effective lobbyists in the 1920s and 1930s as demonstrated by the fact 
that, on the eve of London Naval Conference in 1930, President Hoover invited her to a 
private meeting to justify why the United States was not advocating for complete disarma-
ment and to ask that WILPF ease its disarmament campaign. PLASTAS, supra note 34, at 12.   
61. Women’s organizations, including WILPF, regularly hosted “summer schools” and 
workshops inviting expert guests to speak on topical questions of the day. These programs 
were as much about informing themselves as well as “to enlighten public opinion by prop-
aganda and education.” See also Earle on the strategies adopted by other peace movements 
of the day, describing them as “a quantum leap in ideological and tactical sophistication over 
what had gone before.” Neil Earle, Public Opinion for Peace: Tactics of Peace Activists at the Wash-
ington Conference on Naval Armament, 40 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE 149, 156 (1998).  
62. As an international organization, WILPF actively sought to expand its geographical 
reach and to proactively share knowledge through its sections. Thus, for example, it ar-
ranged for Gertrud Woker’s article on chemical weapons to be published in multiple lan-
guages for global distribution. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 111–12. It should 
be noted that even within organizations such as WILPF there remained unresolved fault 
lines in respect of race, class, and nationality. While feminists were able to reach consensus 
on the need to eliminate racism, colonialism, and imperialism, this did not necessarily mean 
that racism and classism did not exist within their own membership. 
63. For example, in 1930 a deputation of American, British, French, and Japanese 
women representing different women’s organizations united to collectively lobby State rep-
resentatives who had gathered for the London Naval Conference and to press for the re-
duction in war fleets as the “foundations of general disarmament.” DEPUTATION OF AMER-
ICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN RECEIVED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 10 (1930), https://lse-atom.arkivum.net/uklse-dl1-if01-
005-001-0017-0001-pdf-59bfc415-789b-4f8a-8ab6-2d9341d7f147 [hereinafter DEPUTA-
TION OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN]. 












Scientific Warfare to better understand the implications of chemical and bi-
ological warfare.65 In addition to launching public education campaigns, ef-
forts were taken to foster expert networks by appealing directly to leading 
scientists of the day to join in opposing the use and development of chemical 
weapons.66 The adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol was seen by WILPF 
as a partial victory, although activists remained less than sanguine.67 The de-
cision by the US Senate not to ratify the Protocol in the wake of a coordi-
nated campaign of political lobbying by industry and the military, both of 
which were heavily invested in the research, development, and manufacture 
of chemical weapons, brought home to activists the enormity and complex-
ity of the resistance they would encounter in the field of weapons more 
 
65. Both Gertrud Woker (professor of biochemistry and toxicology at Berne Univer-
sity) and Naima Sahlbom (a chemical physicist) attended the Conference of the American 
Chemical Society in April 1924 during which time they visited the Edgewood Arsenal where 
they witnessed various military exercises involving weapons systems using “different uses 
of poison gases combined with white phosphorous.” Following their visit, Woker would 
publish a short paper highlighting the indiscriminate nature of poison gas weapons. Gertrud 
Woker, The Next War, a War of Poison Gas, https://documents.alexanderstreet.com/d/10 
00690572 (last visited May 21, 2021).  
66. The Committee on Chemical Warfare also took the decision “to appeal to scientists 
of the world, urging them to consider their responsibility in the application of their inven-
tions and discoveries for the purposes of war.” WILPF Newsletter from Geneva (Nov. 
1924) (on file in the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Collection, IV-
7-13, Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries, WILPF Papers, 1915-1978, 
Microfilm, Reel 103, frames 1801–1803). National sections in Germany, France, and Czech-
oslovakia took proactive steps to appeal to scientists in higher education establishments. 
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE FIFTH 
CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (1926) 
[hereinafter 5TH CONGRESS REPORT]. The Committee remained active throughout the sec-
ond half of the 1920s and in 1929 organized an expert conference on “Modern Methods of 
Warfare” keeping the issue of gas warfare on the international agenda. WOMEN’S INTERNA-
TIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, REPORT OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE 
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM 28–31 (1929). 
67. Although WILPF remained committed to universal and total disarmament, it took 
the strategic view that supporting partial disarmament measures was a politically prudent 
way forward and, as such, encouraged national sections to press their respective govern-
ments to ratify the Protocol. 5TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 153–54. Activists 
were fully aware of the weakness of the Protocol, which did not contain a legal requirement 
to reduce stockpiles nor a requirement not to produce the weapon. In effect, it was no more 
than a prohibition on the first use of chemical weapons. For a useful critical analysis of the 
Protocol, see Timothy McCormack, International Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 











broadly.68 In particular, the political strategies adopted by the anti-Protocol 
lobby revealed—for the first but not the last time—the ways in which gender 
norms would be invoked to block disarmament.69 For feminist activism, this 
setback made the regulation of the arms industry an even more pressing and 
necessary element of, and step toward, universal disarmament.70 
The need for expert knowledge was not confined to science and tech-
nology but extended to international law, a field from which women contin-
ued to be excluded.71 The potential for international law to secure change at 
the national level—whether it was to advance gender equality or disarma-
ment—was not lost on feminist activists who, notwithstanding the obstacles 
presented, strove to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to speak with 
authority. Their radically different conception of international law as a coun-
ter-hegemonic means through which to shape domestic law was not one 
shared by the political elites who continued to regard it exclusively as a tool 
 
68. Naima Sahlbohm, Report of the Commission on Chemical Warfare, 5TH CONGRESS RE-
PORT, supra note 66, at 152–55. 
69. Slotten observes how the anti-Protocol lobby regularly “characterized their oppo-
nents in patronizing terms as emotional and sentimental” and of how “attacks based on 
gender stereotypes were a strong feature of these patronizing statements.” He continues “by 
portraying the 1920s anti-gas movement as dominated by ‘hysterical’ and ‘unscientific’ 
women, the male chemists and chemical warfare experts hoped to defuse the assault against 
their cause.” Hugh R. Slotten, Humane Chemistry or Scientific Barbarism? American Responses to 
World War I Poison Gas, 1915-1930, 77 THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 476, 492 
(1990). On the interests that were at stake and the strategies adopted by the anti-Protocol 
lobby, see also Daniel P. Jones, Chemists and the Geneva Protocol, 71 ISIS 426 (1980).  
70. In 1926 WILPF adopted a resolution reaffirming its support for universal disarma-
ment and further called for “the international control and supervision of the manufacture 
and traffic in arms, poison gas, and munitions.” 5TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 66, at 
122. 
71. In Britain, it was only in 1919, when the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act came 
into force, that women were allowed to pass their law exams and practice as lawyers. Alt-
hough US women were able to practice earlier in a handful of states, until at least the 1920s 
women were positively excluded from the “inner circle” of international law. For example, 
the first executive meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1906 expressly 
limited membership to “any man of good moral character, interested in the objects of the 
Society.” As Kirgis observes, “women did not become formally eligible for membership 
until 1920.” Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Formative Years of the American Society of International 
Law, 90 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 559, 565 (1996). This change cor-
responded with women being recognized as having the right to vote in August 1920 with 











for regulating inter-State relations.72 For States, preserving a clear distinction 
between the international and domestic legal regimes was needed to retain 
the authority to decide what matters fell within the purview of one regime 
or the other, as a core element of sovereign power. Nonetheless, just as dis-
armament became a matter of international regulation in the first decade of 
twentieth century, the idea of gender equality as a legitimate matter for inter-
national regulation would begin to take hold in the second decade. Feminist 
activists also took a profoundly different view of IHL. Since as early as 1899, 
activists had questioned the value of IHL and rejected the claim that the law 
would protect the civilian population from the effects of modern warfare.73 
Thus, in contrast to other emerging international legal regimes, few feminist 
activists took interest in acquiring expert legal knowledge and instead viewed 
the evolution of IHL with growing disquiet.74   
The failure to reach agreement on general disarmament during the inter-
war years was not due to a lack of effort on the part of those who worked 
 
72. Extant views on the scope and content of international law are best captured in 
the words of the Permanent Court of International Justice:  
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate 
the relations between these co-existing independent communities with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. 
 
SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7). 
73. “We have no belief in the possibility of humanising warfare nor of defending civil 
populations from poison gases or other modern methods of waging war.” Statement by the 
Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organisations in relation to the 
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 9 (Feb. 23, 1932) [hereinafter 
Statement by the Disarmament Committee]. This position contrasts with that taken by the 
male-dominated peace movements which were not entirely antithetical to the progressive 
development of IHL.  
74. Feminist activists had since as early as the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899 
taken this view. Many within the peace movements were shocked when the first Nobel 
Peace Prize was co-awarded to Frederic Passy and Henri Dunant in 1905 as the regulation 
of warfare and weapons was seen as legitimizing violence and an anathema to peace. As 
Passy reportedly stated, “you do not humanize war. You get rid of war by becoming more 
human.” James D. Fry & Saroji Nair, Moral Disarmament: Reviving a Legacy of the Great War, 40 
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 1 (2018). “The Disarmament Committee 
of the League of Nations, although clad in modern attire, reminds us most vividly of a 
corporation called The Hague Conference, the task of which seemed to be to organize, or 
as they thought, to ‘humanize’ war.” 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 56. See also 











within the League.75 In 1926 States would make one last attempt to advance 
disarmament and arms control—by convening the Conference for the Re-
duction and Limitation of Armaments—before the demise of the League 
with the outbreak of World War II.76 The 1932 World Disarmament Con-
ference represented a turning point for feminist activism on two fronts. For 
the first time in history, several States appointed women as official delegates, 
disrupting entrenched prejudices that had barred women’s participation in 
an area regarded as the exclusive domain of men.77 Second, proactive steps 
were taken by a handful of States to include women’s voices into the formal 
process by extending special status to the Women’s Disarmament Commit-
tee (WDC),78 a body which had been created in preparation for the Confer-
ence.79 This move was supported by key figures, including British Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Henderson, who presided over the Conference. The WDC, 
which comprised fourteen women’s international organizations and five na-
tional organizations representing over forty million women from fifty-six 
States across the world, had been founded in September 1931 by feminist 
activists with the specific objective of coordinating women’s input into the 
 
75. For a useful overview and analysis, see Andrew Webster, Making Disarmament Work: 
The Implementation of the International Disarmament Provisions in the League of Nations Covenant, 
1919-1925, 16 DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 551 (2005).  
76. During this period there was an increase in military expenditure and capacity by 
States. For example, see Samuel Hoare, British Secretary of State for Air, Memorandum on 
Disarmament (Oct. 6, 1927) (on file with The National Archives, Kew, CAB 24/188/33).  
77. Uruguay appointed Pauline Luisi; Britain, Margery Corbett Ashby; the United 
States, Mary Woolley; Canada, Winifred Kydd; and Poland, Anna Poradowska-Szelagowska.  
78. The WDC (or Peace and Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International 
Organisations) included the International Council of Women, the International Alliance of 
Women, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the World's Young 
Women’s Christian Association, and the League of Jewish Women, among others. Associ-
ated national consultative members included the National Committee on the Cause and 
Cure of War (U.S.) and the Women's Peace Crusade (Great Britain).  
79. A resolution tabled by the Spanish delegation to the League General Assembly to 
“consider the possibility of studying the means of associating feminine action and feminine 
feeling the work of the League of Nations by effective and direct collaboration” opened the 
way for women’s involvement in the Conference. Secretary-General of the League of Na-
tions, Memorandum, Cooperation of Women in the Organisation of Peace, in League of 
Nations (Jan. 22, 1932), https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-77-
1932_EN.pdf. See also the report by the Spanish Representative, to “increase collaboration 
of women with the work of the League.” Report by the Spanish Representative to the 












Conference process.80 In addition, the WDC functioned as a knowledge hub 
and clearing-house for information;81 an education and dissemination body; 
and a campaign body dedicated to building global public support for the 
Conference, including through petitions (just as they had done in 1899 and 
193082) that were presented to the delegates at the opening of the confer-
ence.83   
Although the Disarmament Conference was officially suspended in early 
1936, by 1935 it was clear to many, including the WDC, that there would be 
no meaningful agreement on disarmament.84 Any optimism at the opening 
 
80. See Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organisation, Appeal 
(1934) (on file in the Women’s Library, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Corbett Ashby archives 7MCA/C/08-09, Box FL484, 1934-1942) [hereinafter Appeal]. The 
organization ceased operation about 1940. For a history of the WDC, see DENISE IRETON, 
FIGHTING FOR PEACE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CITY: THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE OF 
THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GENEVA 1931-1939 (2012).      
81. In its fundraising appeal notice, the Committee described itself as the “centre of an 
international network of communication.” Appeal, supra note 80.  
82. In 1930 the Women’s Peace Crusade composed of women’s organizations from 
Britain, the United States, France, and Japan, and representing over two million women met 
with the leaders of the delegations at the London Naval Conference and presented them 
with a petition with nearly 200,000 signatures.    
83. Petitions with over eight million signatures were presented in a plenary session of 
the conference on February 6, 1932. Arthur Henderson, Preliminary Report on the Work 
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments 14 (July 1936), 
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00089a.pdf. Some contemporaneous ac-
counts mention twelve million signatures (with six million secured by WILPF alone). Rec-
ords indicate that four petitions were circulating during 1930 and 1931 and, although some 
were more forcefully worded, each called on participating governments to achieve mean-
ingful disarmament. See HARRIET HYMAN ALONSO, PEACE AS A WOMEN’S ISSUE 120–21 
(1993). The originals were destroyed—probably during WWII—although photographs and 
film footage remain, as do unsigned copies of the petition (the petition is on file in the 
archives of the People’s History Museum, Manchester, UK, LP/ID/DIS/2/3).   
84. In March 1935, Corbett Ashby resigned from the British delegation in protest fol-
lowing the announcement by the British government of its intention to expand its air force 
capabilities. Letter from the Prime Minister’s Office to Dame Corbett Ashby (Mar. 12, 1935) 
(on file in The Women’s Library, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Ref. No. 7MCA/C/05-06, Box FL483). For a damning critique, see Margery Corbett Ashby, 
The Failure in Leadership at the Disarmament Conference 4 (1935) (on file in The Women’s Library, 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, Ref. No. 7MCA/C/05-06, Box 
FL483). In particular, Corbett Ashby was critical of “the attempt to humanise war” by the 













had been dampened by increasing incidents of inter-State conflict, rising lev-
els of militarism and nationalism, the emergence of fascism (and with it, the 
persecution of minorities), and the re-escalation of the arms race.85 In 1935, 
the WDC changed its name to the Peace and Disarmament Committee to 
reflect a widening of its stated objectives.86 This intellectual shift represented 
both a frustration with the lack of progress by States and a rejection of the 
 
Aircraft, and in particular air bombers, were not to be abolished but air attack against civil-
ians was to be “absolutely prohibited” and the number and characteristics of aircraft to be 
regulated; it was also decided to limit guns and tanks, but no size or weight was agreed upon; 
also to prohibit chemical bacteriological and incendiary warfare under certain conditions 
(unspecified!). In the following months we did nothing but prevent and hamper the discus-
sion of the regulation, publicity and international control that would be necessary to make 
even the conditions of this vague resolution workable. 
 
Id. As early as July 1932, Edouard Herriot, France’s Prime Minister, had observed, “‘to dis-
arm’ is an irregular verb, with no first person, and only conjugated in the future tense.” 1 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS RECORDS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITA-
TION OF ARMAMENTS 195, SERIES B: MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COMMISSION, 9 FEB. – 
23 JULY 1932, at 195 (1932). See also the memorandum by the British Secretary of State for 
Air which reads:  
 
Whilst it is easy to make an argument for the futility of the Conference, I take the view that 
the wise course for us to adopt is the course of friendly and cautious support rather than of 
open hostility or negative suspicion. Quite rightly, we have repeatedly said “No” to the 
several impracticable proposals for security that have been made by the League, and this or 
that Continental Government. Quite rightly, also, we were not prepared to endanger our 
naval security at the Geneva Conference. 
  
Hoare, supra note 76.  
85. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria; fascism was on the rise in Spain (leading to civil 
unrest from 1932 onwards), in Germany (with programs of mass persecution from 1933 
onwards), and in Italy. In 1935 Italy, under Mussolini, invaded Ethiopia. With their initial 
euphoria and optimism dashed, many women peace activists found themselves struggling 
to remain committed to disarmament, especially against a rising tide of fascism. See, for 
example, Clara Ragaz, Problems Resulting for the Work and Methods of the WILPF, MINUTES OF 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM: 
EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1934). The rise of fascism divided women activists. 
See Julie V. Gottlieb, Broken Friendships and Vanished Loyalties: Gender, Collective (in)Security and 
Anti-Fascism in Britain in the 1930s, 13 POLITICS, RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 197 (2012). 
86. In addition to pressing for disarmament, the Peace and Disarmament Committee 
aimed to “spread knowledge and understanding of the great issues underlying the organisa-
tion of peace” and to “enlist the support of women in all parts of the world in the service 
of peace.” Peace and Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organiza-
tions, Pamphlet (1935) (on file in the Sophia Smith Collection, Women’s History Archives, 
Smith College Library, Folder 3, Box 5). See Peace and Disarmament Committee of the 











siloed and decontextualized approach to disarmament adopted by govern-
ments. The recoupling of peace and disarmament opened the way for addi-
tional strategies to be developed and feminist peace activists were better able 
to register the linkages between conflict and structural oppressions,87 de-
velop critical analyses that addressed the causes of conflict, and to advance 
holistic strategies in pursuit of peace, integral to which was disarmament.88 
For feminist peace activists, universal and total disarmament could not be 
divorced from the dismantling of the private arms trade, nor could it be di-
vorced from militarism, colonialism, and patriarchy, each of which operated 
to normalize inequalities between and within States.  
Feminist activists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had 
not demanded political rights and the right to participate in political life 
merely “to continue the style of politics which men had introduced into the 
world.”89 Rather, their ambition was “to change politics entirely.”90 The core 
of that vision was universal disarmament, a goal that increasingly united fem-
inist peace activists across the world throughout the inter-war period. How 
 
87. Feminist activism, exemplified by the work of WILPF, had sought to understand 
the interlinkages and causal connections between, for example, imperialism, militarism, cap-
italism, accountability, inequality, the arms industry and arms trade, minority rights, and 
sovereign equality. Underpinning this work was the awareness that disarmament could only 
be secured through a critical analysis of the complex systems and structures that operated 
as obstacles as demonstrated through the discussions held among WILPF’s membership in 
1924 and 1937 around “A New International Order” or “Colonialism and Economic Im-
perialism” in 1926.  
88. An example of this was the statement of aims as voted by WILPF during its Eighth 
Congress in 1934 in Zurich, which stated:  
 
the primary object of the WILPF remain: total and universal disarmament, the abolition of 
violent means of coercion for the settlement of all conflicts, the substitution in every case 
of some form of peaceful settlement, and the development of a world organization for the 
political, social and economic cooperation of peoples. Conscious that these aims cannot be 
attained and that a real and lasting peace and true freedom cannot exist under the present 
system of exploitation, privilege and profit they consider that their duty is to facilitate and 
hasten by non-violent methods the social transformation which would permit the inaugu-
ration of a new system under which would be realised social, economic and political equality 
for all without distinction of sex, race or opinion. 
   
Clara Ragaz, Address, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM: 
EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS REPORT (1934) (on file in the Swarthmore College 
Peace Collection, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom Collection 
DG043). 
89. Lida Gustava Heymann, Survey of the Nine Years’ History of the WILPF, 4TH CON-
GRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 42.  











women sought to shape the disarmament debate shifted over this period. 
During the early years they often subscribed to essentialist notions as the 
basis upon which to claim participatory rights in the field of disarmament 
and weapons. But over time, and with their partial entry into the public do-
main, greater emphasis was placed on their expert knowledge that allowed 
them to speak with authority on an equal footing with their male counter-
parts. Yet, whether it was within the peace movements themselves or in the 
corridors of power at the League, feminists were fully aware that the down-
side of being heard was the need to speak in the prevailing masculine and 
militarized language which, rather than advancing disarmament, blocked 
progress.91   
 
III. OBSTACLES  
 
“It is very difficult to put together the words ‘Peace’ and ‘Security’ and make them agree, 
and if you succeed in making them agree you will have achieved a great accomplishment.”  
Madame Rudler, Addressing the  
London Naval Conference92  
  
Feminist transnational peace activism was suspended for much of the war 
years.93 However, in the immediate aftermath of the war, women’s groups 
made certain that the institutional gains they had secured in the League were 
not lost with the creation of the United Nations.94 Several women’s interna-
tional organizations, including WILPF, the International Council of 
 
91. The absence of a common language is a theme addressed by Woolf in her essay. 
WOOLF, supra note 10, at 6.    
92. Madame Rudler, Address at the London Naval Conference, DEPUTATION OF 
AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH AND JAPANESE WOMEN, supra note 63, at 10. 
93. During the war years women peace activists were subject to multiple and dispro-
portionate forms of persecution by both Axis and Allied powers, albeit to differing degrees. 
Harriet Hyman Alonso, The Longest Living Women’s Peace Organization, in WORLD HISTORY: 
THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 1915 TO THE PRE-
SENT 13 (2012).  
94. There was a real concern among feminist activists that women would, once more, 
be excluded from international institutions. See, e.g., WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE 
FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, XTH INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM AT LUXEM-











Women,95 and the Women’s International Democratic Federation,96 were 
among the first non-governmental organizations that were able to acquire 
consultative status to the Economic and Social Council, thereby giving them 
access to certain UN bodies, including the General Assembly and Human 
Rights Council. These institutional footholds, together with the subsequent 
creation of special women’s institutions such as the Commission on the Sta-
tus of Women, provided valuable international platforms to further women’s 
particular concerns. Paradoxically, however, they also served to exclude 
women from other areas, not least disarmament.97 Thus, notwithstanding 
institutional inclusion, in that non-governmental organizations had been ac-
corded “no defined role”98 within the UN’s disarmament architecture, 
WILPF found itself unable to advance the case for universal disarmament, 
made even more difficult by US-Soviet rivalry for military, ideological, and 
political dominance and the advent of nuclear weapons. For much of the 
second half of the twentieth century, anti-war feminist activism was shaped 
by Cold War geopolitics and the schism which unfolded between nuclear-
weapon States (including those seeking such weapons) and States that sought 
a world free from such weapons in the political form of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. It was against this backdrop that feminists sought to develop 
new and creative strategies to reposition discussions on disarmament (both 
within and outside the UN institutions and multilateral disarmament mech-
anisms), and to challenge entrenched approaches and dominant views.99    
For anti-war feminists, the view—or rather claim—that has proved es-
pecially difficult to dislodge in the post-war period is (“the reductio ad absurdum 
 
95. For a useful history on the International Council of Women, see LEILA J RUPP, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF WOMEN: 1888 TO THE PRESENT (2012).  
96. The Women’s International Democratic Federation was established in late 1945 in 
Paris by a group of left-leaning feminists. It was the most influential transnational women’s 
organization among eastern bloc States and the global south during the Cold War period.  
97. Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men’s Club: Feminist Futures for the United 
Nations, 4 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 445, 421 (1994).  
98. Adelaide Nichols Baker, Work with the United Nations, 14TH INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM STOCK-
HOLM, SWEDEN, 27TH TO 31ST JULY 1959, at 57 (1959) [hereinafter 14TH CONGRESS RE-
PORT]. 
99. WILPF’s activists recognized early on that with the advent of nuclear power “rev-
olutionary” thinking on and around disarmament was required. Gladys Walser, Disarmament, 
13TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR 
PEACE AND FREEDOM, BIRMINGHAM, ENGLAND 23RD-28TH JULY 1956, at 96 (1956) [here-
inafter 13TH CONGRESS REPORT]. See also Kathleen Londsdale, World Events and the Nuclear 











theory”100) that weapons are an effective means by which to guarantee peace. 
Exemplified by Winston Churchill’s warning to a Joint Session of the US 
Congress in January 1952 to “be careful above all things not to let go of the 
atomic weapon until you are sure, and more than sure, that other means of 
preserving peace are in your hands,”101 this reasoning has been allowed to 
take root and thrive by the very post-war normative architecture adopted, 
namely, the UN Charter. In contrast to the Covenant of the League, which 
was founded on the belief that the arms race had created insecurity, making 
war inevitable, the Charter rests on the competing rationale that it was the 
insecurity between States which led to the inter-war arms race and ultimately 
war.102 Thus, rather than recognizing disarmament as a substantive goal and 
the precondition to peace, the Charter centers the prohibition on the use of force 
and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States as its two 
interlinking core values to “maintain international peace and security.”103 
This conceptual reorientation has all too often enabled States to insist on the 
need for attaining national security as the precondition to disarmament. The Char-
ter’s structure builds on this logic and stands as a constant reminder, reaf-
firmed by the International Court of Justice, that “in international law there 
are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, 
 
100. See ADDAMS, NEWER IDEALS OF PEACE, supra note 26, at 5, who comments, “cer-
tainly no theory could be devised which is more cumbersome, more roundabout, more ex-
travagant, than the reductio ad absurdum of the peace-secured-by-the-preparation-for-war the-
ory.”  
101. Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, Address to the U.S. Congress (Jan. 17, 
1952). 
102. This rationale was repetitively invoked by President Ronald Reagan with the words 
that “nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because 
they mistrust each other.” See, e.g., Ronald Reagan, United States President, Address to the 
UN General Assembly (Sept. 22, 1986), https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/io/potus 
unga/207355.htm. The rationale continued to shape US foreign policy throughout the Cold 
War period and beyond. More recently, in its submission to the Preparatory Committee for 
the 2020 Review Conference for the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, the United States stated: 
 
If we continue to focus on numerical reductions and immediate abolition of nuclear weap-
ons, without addressing the real underlying security concerns that led to their production in 
the first place, and to their retention, we will advance neither the cause of disarmament nor 
the cause of enhanced collective international security.  
 
United States Delegation, Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament: Working Paper Sub-
mitted by the United States of America, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30 (Apr. 18, 
2018).   











by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State 
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception.”104 
Articles 42, 46, 47, and 51 separately and collectively recognize that, in ex-
ceptional circumstances, the resort to armed force may be necessary to se-
cure peace and security and thus reinforce the need for weapons, embracing 
an ends/means paradox that cannot be resolved.105 Moreover, as critics have 
repeatedly underscored, notwithstanding the assertion that it is organized 
“on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,” the post-war 
institutional edifice is founded on a hierarchy, distinguishing between the 
permanent members of the Security Council and other member States, dis-
tributing political power according to military strength. Thus, for anti-war 
feminists, a culture of militarism is embedded within the very fabric of the 
existing institutional global order cemented through international law. Fi-
nally, the decision by the drafters to conjoin peace and security has served 
not only to elide the potential discord between the two purposes—both of 
which remain ambiguous, contested, and unquantifiable—but to recast, as 
Churchill did, weapons as necessary to peace. 
Disarmament was not entirely omitted from the Charter. Both the Gen-
eral Assembly and Security Council are charged with responsibilities for fur-
thering disarmament. Article 11 grants the General Assembly the power to 
“consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, including principles governing disarmament and 
the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard 
to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.”   
The Security Council is specifically tasked with “formulating . . . plans to be 
submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a 
system for the regulation of armaments” in order “to promote the establish-
 
104. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 269 (June 27). 
105. Even setting aside the sentiment of the Preamble (“to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war;” “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another 
as good neighbours”), Article 1, which identifies the purposes of the United Nations, argu-
ably envisages a global order committed to non-violence. Yet, at the same time, Articles 42, 
46, 47, and 51 all assume the resort to some form of militarized force. Nor, for that matter 
can the Charter divest itself of violence to the extent that all law is constituted by and en-
forced through violence. The word “enforceability” as Derrida suggests, “reminds us that 
there is no such thing as law that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, . . . the possibility of being 
‘enforced’, applied by force.” Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Au-











ment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least di-
version for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.”106 
However, the history of disarmament since 1945 reveals the singular failure 
on the part of the Security Council to fulfill its mandate, in contrast to the 
General Assembly which has, in the words of John Burroughs, “vigorously 
exercised its power under Article 11.”107 In particular, the General Assem-
bly’s repeated reaffirmation of the interlinkage between peace and disarma-
ment, redolent of the pre-war rationale, culminated with a significant break-
through in 1959. The unanimous adoption of Resolution 1378 not only in-
stated “general and complete disarmament under effective international con-
trol” as a substantive goal of the international community—and possibly the 
most important one—but, significantly, recognized disarmament as a means 
by which both security and peace could be achieved, disrupting the underly-
ing Charter rationale.108 
 
106. U.N. Charter art. 26. The paradox is that permanent members of the Security 
Council comprise the “exclusive club” of nuclear-weapon States and have, since 1945, been 
the top global exporters of arms (with Germany). 
107. John Burroughs, Legal Aspects of General and Complete Disarmament, in RETHINKING 
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15, U.N. Sales 
No. E.16.IX.8 (2016). For example, the very first resolution adopted by the General Assem-
bly was to establish the Atomic Energy Commission with the mandate to make proposals 
“for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major 
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” G.A. Res. 1, ¶ 5(b) (Dec. 13, 1946). Over the years 
the General Assembly, through the work of the First Committee, has taken numerous 
measures—creating mechanisms and initiating dialogue—to stimulate progress. For exam-
ple, in 1952 the UN Disarmament Commission was established with the mandate to prepare 
a draft treaty for the regulation, limitation, and reduction of armed forces and armaments, 
including elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. G.A. Res. 502(VI) (Jan. 11, 1952). 
The Assembly has also established the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1980) and 
the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (1982), facilitated three special sessions devoted to 
disarmament, and adopted numerous resolutions on disarmament.  
108. G.A. Res. 1378, pmbl., para. 5 (Nov. 20, 1959). A compelling argument can be 
made that Resolution 1378 is binding on States by virtue of its now customary international 
law status. It should also be borne in mind that resolutions of the General Assembly may 
even modify the Charter. This has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in 
its advisory opinion on the status of Namibia and confirmed in principle in the Nicaragua 
judgment. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 104 (June 21); Military and Paramilitary Activities, 
1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 188, 195. The adoption of the resolution galvanized efforts within the 
United Nations to undertake studies on the economic and social impact of disarmament to 
preempt domestic objections and resistance. For additional historical context, see MICHAEL 
SPIES, UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS TO REDUCE MILITARY EXPENDITURES: A HISTORICAL 











The resolution was widely welcomed by peace activists, including 
WILPF which, earlier in the year, had called on the General Assembly to 
“consider disarmament as its most pressing task,”109 made especially urgent 
by the ever-shifting political positions among nuclear-weapon States due to 
changing assessments around military capabilities.110 All optimism was soon 
dashed with the collapse of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, the 
political mechanism tasked with progressing disarmament pursuant to Res-
olution 1378.111 Although the prospect for advancing disarmament was re-
kindled in 1961 with the adoption by the United States and the Soviet Union 
of the McCloy/Zorin principles112 calling for cooperation among States in 
 
109. WILPF Disarmament Resolution, 14TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, at 93. 
In its preamble Resolution 1378 recognized that “the question of general and complete 
disarmament is the most important one facing the world today.”  
110. See, for example, Gladys Walser’s observations that,  
 
for those who have followed the disarmament discussions in the United Nations for the 
past ten years, it is revealing and at the same time frustrating to observe the reversals of 
positions of the two sides. For example, in 1946 and thereafter, Mr Gromyko contended 
unsuccessfully that atomic and non-atomic disarmament were inseparable. The Western 
powers after dismissing this claim, accepted it in 1951. Now in 1956, the same Mr Gromyko 
insists there are no cogent reasons for linking the two. 
   
13TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 99, at 102–3.  
111. Although the General Assembly sought to retain ultimate control over general 
disarmament, Resolution 1378 recognized the establishment of a parallel political process 
in the form of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, a political initiative supported by 
the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom, outside the UN disarmament 
machinery. It nevertheless required the Committee’s reports to be presented to the Disarma-
ment Commission and to both the General Assembly and Security Council, emphasizing 
that the “ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures” belonged to the UN. 
UN Disarmament Commission Resolution DC/146 (Sept. 10, 1959). The activities of the 
Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee were terminated in June 1960.  
112. See Perm Rep. of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the U.N. and Perm 
Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 1961 from the 
Permanent Reps. of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of Amer-
ica to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. 
A/4879 (Sept. 20, 1961) (transmitting the “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of Dis-
armament Negotiations”). The Principles were widely welcomed at the time and endorsed 
by the General Assembly, which created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 
(later evolving into the Conference on Disarmament) to consider options for realizing gen-
eral and complete disarmament. While some scholars have subsequently dismissed the Prin-
ciples as a Cold War anachronism and a cynical rhetorical device serving to elide political 
realities, others have viewed the initiative as the outcome of a moment of utopian ambition. 
See, e.g., N.D. Jayaprakash, Conning Humanity in the Name of Disarmament, ECONOMIC & PO-











reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament, feminist 
peace activists remained only cautiously optimistic. The subsequent release 
by the United States of a white paper entitled “Freedom from War: The 
United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful 
World”113 was interpreted by the Soviet Union as evidence of US insincerity, 
but it also served to reaffirm feminist concerns that Resolution 1378 would 
be read to privilege national security over disarmament.   
Throughout the Cold War period the field of inter-State disarmament 
was dictated by a narrow class of political elites within the United States and 
the Soviet Union to the exclusion of most States and, for the most part, 
women. Confronted by the fact that equality in law had done little to disrupt 
the gendered space of disarmament (nor for that matter had it delivered the 
equal distribution of political power), feminist peace activists sought out al-
lies among some new and emerging States, including those within the Non-
Aligned Movement which, at its founding conference in Bandung in 1955, 
had declared that “universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the 
preservation of peace.”114 In addition to urging for “disarmament and the 
prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear weapons,” the Non-Aligned Movement called on the UN 
“to continue its efforts” and “appealed to all concerned speedily to bring 
about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces 
and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimenta-
tion and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective 
international control to this end.”115   
 
113. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. NO. 7277, FREEDOM FROM WAR: THE 
UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A PEACEFUL 
WORLD (1961) (emphasis added).   
114. FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE OF BANDUNG 6 
(1955).  
115. At its Second Conference of Heads of State in 1964, the Non-Aligned Movement 
called for the convening of a world disarmament conference. In June 1965 the Disarmament 
Commission adopted a resolution calling for such a conference, which was further endorsed 
by the General Assembly in Resolution 2030 of November 1965. G.A. Res. 2030 (XX) 
(Nov. 29, 1995). WILPF likewise pressed for such a conference to “assess all initiatives thus 
far offered particularly those dealing with the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, 
establish clear guide line, formulate concrete proposals, and approve . . . an agreement leading 
to general and complete disarmament.” WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE 
AND FREEDOM, 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL 
LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, THE HAGUE, HOLLAND 26TH TO THE 31ST JULY 











Although the vision outlined in the Final Communiqué more closely 
aligned with WILPF’s goals,116 it did not escape anti-war feminists that for 
States the goal of general and complete disarmament was framed by Article 
26 of the Charter.117 The provision recognizes the right of States to maintain 
defensive capabilities, albeit at the lowest possible level, paralleling the stance 
taken by the League pursuant to Article 8 of the Covenant, which had called 
for the reduction of national armaments to the “lowest point consistent with 
national safety.” Nor were feminists blind to the fact that the institutional 
gains made by the global South, or indeed by members of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, into the world of disarmament did not result in the inclusion of 
women, let alone feminist goals. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, which was established in 1962 and tasked to consider how to make 
general and complete disarmament a reality, may have created space around 
the table for those whose voices had until then been excluded, but the dele-
gations—old and new—were comprised almost entirely of men.118 For much 
of its existence, Sweden’s Alva Myrdal remained the sole woman delegate 
with feminist leanings to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee ne-
gotiations.119 
Feminist activism during this period was focused principally on protest-
ing against nuclear weapons and testing.120 At the international level, activists 
 
116. See the report by Gertrude Baer in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR 
PEACE AND FREEDOM, 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE WOMEN’S INTERNA-
TIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM: ASILOMAR, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 8TH TO 
13TH JULY 1962, at 26–27 (1962) [hereinafter 15TH CONGRESS REPORT]. 
117. Article 26 of the UN Charter refers to “the least diversion for armaments of the 
world’s human and economic resources.”   
118. In addition to the original members, which included Canada, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, the United States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the So-
viet Union, the new members included Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Sweden, and the United Arab Republic.  
119. For an insight into Myrdal’s view on disarmament, see ALVA MYRDAL, THE GAME 
OF DISARMAMENT: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA RUN THE ARMS RACE (1976).  
120. During this period, testing programs were conducted by nuclear-weapon States 
within and outside their own territories, including in the commons. For example, between 
1946 and 1958 the United States alone conducted sixty-seven tests in the Pacific Islands 
region (which effectively became its nuclear weapons testing laboratory), including the det-
onation of a hydrogen bomb on March 1, 1954, that produced around fifteen megatons of 
power, equivalent to one thousand Hiroshima bombs. As scientific data began to emerge 
pointing to the severe long-term impact on human health of the radioactive fallout from 
testing, women’s organizations such as WILPF began to focus their attention on the health 












sought to maximize the potential that the new institutions and processes of-
fered, although it would take very many decades before some of their pro-
posals would subsequently be adopted by States. For example, in the early 
1950s WILPF appealed to the fledgling World Health Organization to con-
sider the public health implications of nuclear weapons testing, but the sug-
gestion was rejected on the grounds that the “issue of experiments with nu-
clear weapons is a political issue . . . and we at WHO must, of course, abstain 
from any discussion of political questions.”121 Two decades later, the World 
Health Assembly adopted a resolution deploring “all nuclear weapons testing 
which result in such an increase in the level of ionizing radiation in the at-
mosphere” and urged the “immediate cessation” of testing.122 Amidst the 
 
data was also showing that women were experiencing multiple miscarriages and stillbirths, 
and were giving birth to babies with severe mental and physical defects as a consequence of 
testing, gave additional weight to arguments that such programs were having different and 
disproportionate adverse effects on women. The challenge for organizations such as WILPF 
was identifying the institutional entry point through which their voices could be registered.   
121. 13TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 99, at 24. It was the view of the then-secre-
tary-general of the World Health Organization (WHO) that the matter did not fall within 
the purview of the organization. Recalling her efforts to convince the organization to alter 
course, Baer states, 
 
I had taken the stand that WHO was responsible for the protection of public health on a 
world-wide scale and that this responsibility was challenged through the fact that the lives 
and health of many people might be and were indeed threatened through the effect of ex-
perimental bombing in peace-time. But WHO remained adamant in asserting that there was 
no possibility of including this question in their deliberations. 
  
Id. at 23. The WHO instead focused its attention to the health consequences of atomic 
energy. The value of this work aside, WILPF continued to maintain its position that “mili-
tary uses of atomic energy [was] of greater importance than its peaceful uses.” 16TH CON-
GRESS REPORT, supra note 115, at 122.   
122. World Health Organization, Res. WHA 26.57 (1973), reprinted in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY AND THE EXECUTIVE 
BOARD, 1973-1984, at 121 (1985). In 1981 the World Health Assembly adopted Resolution 
WHA 34.38 declaring the promotion and preservation of peace as the single most important 
factor in achieving health for all and, in collaboration with the UN Secretary-General, es-
tablished a committee of scientists and experts to undertake a “comprehensive study and 
elucidation of the threat of thermonuclear war and its potentially baneful consequences for 
the life and health of peoples of the world.” Res. WHA 34.38 (1981), reprinted in id. at 398. 
The report, released in 1983, concluded that it was impossible to prepare health services to 
deal in any systematic way with a catastrophe resulting from nuclear warfare and that “the 












increasing levels of testing among nuclear-weapon States, and undeterred by 
the institutional resistance confronted, feminist activists continued to use all 
opportunities available to them, including the international law-making pro-
cess, as a means by which to prevent further nuclear testing.123   
At the national level, growing numbers of women joined mainstream 
civil society movements to protest against nuclear testing by their respective 
 
vention of such explosions, that is the prevention of atomic war.” Report of the Interna-
tional Committee of Experts in Medical Sciences and Public Health to Implement Resolu-
tion WHA 34.38, at 7, Doc. A36/12 (Mar. 24, 1983). In 1993 the Director-General of the 
World Health Organization noted that the report “constituted WHO’s major contribution 
to the International Year of Peace (1986).” Report by the Director-General of the World 
Health Organization, Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons ¶ 10, WHO 
Doc. A46/30 (Apr. 26, 1993). The question of the WHO’s mandate also arose in connection 
with the proposal to request the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on 
the legality of nuclear weapons under international law and the WHO’s Constitution. While 
the Australian delegate to the World Health Assembly expressed the view that “the legality 
of nuclear weapons . . . was a political issue which did not fall into the arena of world health 
and it was therefore inappropriate for the Health Assembly to consider it,” most States 
disagreed and the request was passed 75–33 with 5 abstentions. 46th World Health Assem-
bly: Summary Records of Committees 268, WHA Doc. 46/1993/REC/3 (May 12, 1993). 
Although the International Court of Justice found that Article 2 of the WHO’s Constitution 
could be read “as authorizing the Organization to deal with the effects on health of the use 
of nuclear weapons . . . and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health of 
the populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged in,” 
Article 2 did not confer upon the Organization a “competence to address the legality of the 
use of nuclear weapons.” Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 
Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227, ¶ 21 (July 8).  
123. WILPF had recognized the potential of introducing a provision forbidding nuclear 
testing into the International Law Commission’s draft Convention on the Freedom of the 
High Seas and actively lobbied States to support the proposal. Although the final agreed 
draft of the Convention on the High Seas did not specifically address testing, WILPF wel-
comed the inclusion of Article 25, which appeared to provide the possibility for an end to 
testing. Gertrude Baer, Nuclear Tests on High Seas, 14TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 98, 
at 49–51. However, much to the disappointment of activists, the rejection of an express 
proposal to prohibit testing was interpreted by States as permitting testing. This reading of 
the Convention was made unambiguous by the chairman of the US delegation to the nego-
tiations who, commenting on the treaty, stated “a variety of undesirable Russian proposals, 
among them a rule banning nuclear tests on the high seas—the adoption of which would 
have prevented the tests recently conducted at Eniwetok, and negotiations on that subject 
now going on in Geneva—were defeated.” Arthur H. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: What was Accomplished, 52 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 607, 627 
(1958). That States were misstating the adverse consequences of testing prompted WILPF 
to adopt a resolution at their 1962 conference expressing their “alarm [at] the attempts being 
made deliberately to underestimate the dangers of nuclear testing.” 15TH CONGRESS RE-











governments, only to experience similar patterns of marginalization within 
such movements. Frustrated that their specific concerns were not being 
given due consideration,124 women began to establish parallel organizations, 
exemplified by the formation of the US-based Women Strike for Peace.125 
The Women Strike for Peace garnered considerable popular support among 
mainstream America, leading to one the largest women’s protests of the 
twentieth century when, on November 1, 1961, fifty thousand women 
marched in sixty cities in the United States to demonstrate against nuclear 
weapons testing. In adopting strategies that conformed with prevailing ideas 
around women’s role in society as mothers,126 the Women Strike for Peace 
leadership was able to capitalize on public support and thereby exert some 
influence over the Kennedy administration’s decision to adopt the Limited 
 
124. See Amy Swerdlow, Ladies’ Day at the Capitol: Women Strike for Peace versus HUAC, 8 
FEMINIST STUDIES 493 (1982). According to Swerdlow, the five women who established 
the Women Strike for Peace were previously members of the National Committee for a 
Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) but  
 
gravitated toward each other because of their mutual distaste for SANE’s internal red hunt, 
which they felt contributed to an escalation, rather than an end to cold war hysteria . . . [and] 
resented the reluctance of SANE’s male leadership to deal with “mother’s issues” such as 
the contamination of milk by radioactive fallout from nuclear tests. 
 
 Id. at 509.  
125. The emergence of Women Strike for Peace must also be seen in the context of 
rising feminist activism in the United States with the publication of Betty Friedan’s book, 
The Feminine Mystique. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). Although it was 
rightly criticized for its narrow perspective, the book became a bestseller and to that extent 
was highly influential within popular culture, in particular, among white middle class women. 
126. For example, see interview with Dagmar Wilson, the long-standing spokesperson 
for the Women Strike for Peace, where Wilson stated:  
 
You know how men are. They talk in abstractions and the technicalities of the bomb, almost 
as if this were all a game of chess. Well, it isn’t. . . . There are times, it seems to me, when 
the only thing to do is let out a loud scream. . . . Just women raising a hue and cry against 
nuclear weapons for all of them to cut it out. 
  
Quoted in Elaine Woo, Dagmar Wilson Dies at 94; Organizer of Women’s Disarmament Protesters, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 30, 2011), https://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-
dagmar-wilson-20110130-story.html. For how shifting gender identities influenced 
women’s political activism, see also Lisa Yaszek, Stories ‘That Only a Mother’ Could Write, 16 











Test Ban Treaty in 1963.127 The “politics of motherhood” strategy neverthe-
less alienated the more progressive generation of feminists who viewed such 
strategies as perpetuating sex role stereotypes and thus wholly counter-pro-
ductive in the struggle for gender equality.128 Committed to challenging so-
cially constructed notions of women, these feminists rejected being identi-
fied through traditional role models as mothers and wives but rather sought 
to claim political power as women on an equal basis with men. Although the 
Women Strike for Peace secured mainstream public support in the early 
years, this did not shield them from the toxic political climate of the 1960s.129 
Nor, for that matter, did public support last when the activists stepped out-
side their traditional feminine roles to challenge the culture of militarism and 
of political ideology.130 For anti-war feminist activists, the consequences of 
 
127. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and 
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. The treaty entered into force 
in October 1963 with the ratification by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United 
Kingdom. On how much influence the Women Strike for Peace had on Kennedy’s decision, 
see Swerdlow, supra note 124, at 496–97; Susan Frances Dion, Challenges to Cold War Or-
thodoxy: Women and Peace, 1945-1963, at 221–22 (Sept. 1991) (Ph.D. dissertation, Mar-
quette University). Although the Women Strike for Peace maintained a constant barrage of 
activities, including letter writing, political lobbying, demonstrations, and vigils, the political 
influence wielded by the group should not be overstated. The Kennedy administration was 
already in discussions with the Soviet Union over the prospect of banning testing in both 
bilateral and multilateral fora. Efforts to negotiate a treaty had been ongoing since 1955 
within the Subcommittee of Five (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, and 
Soviet Union) of the UN Disarmament Commission and talks were ongoing within the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Between 1958 and 1963 the General Assembly 
adopted a dozen resolutions pressing for a test ban agreement under international control. 
Although all talks came to a standstill in 1962, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
October of that year, following the crisis direct talks resumed between the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom and by the spring of 1963 agreement had been 
reached to negotiate a test ban treaty.  
128. For anti-war feminist activists it was the essentialist discourse, reasoning, and strat-
egies adopted by the Women Strike for Peace that were problematic. 
129. In 1962 members of the Women Strike for Peace and WILPF, and other women 
peace activists, were required to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities as part of an investigation into “communist activities in the peace movements.” 
Somewhat problematically, the Women Strike for Peace justified their opposition to the 
arms race and nuclear testing by identifying themselves as mothers anxious to protect their 
children. Hearings before the H. Comm. on Un-American Activities, 87th Cong. 2074 
(1963). 
130. Six years later, when the same women protested against Vietnam, they were casti-












speaking out during this period were harsh: sometimes they were criminal-
ized,131 often they were silenced and their organizations were forced to dis-
band,132 and always they were ostracized for their political views and their 
gender.133 
 
Women and the Socialist Question, in WOMEN AND SOCIALISM – SOCIALISM AND WOMEN 516 
(Helmut Gurber & Pamela Graves eds., 1998). 
131. According to Dion, Marjorie Swann, a WILPF activist, was arrested and sentenced 
to a West Virginia federal women’s prison for protesting against nuclear missiles in 1959. 
Dion, supra note 127, at 65. Likewise, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, hundreds of women 
peace activists protesting the deployment of US cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at 
Greenham Common in the United Kingdom were arrested and criminalized for breaching 
bylaws introduced by the government in 1985 pursuant to the 1892 Military Lands Act. 
132. In the United States, women’s organizations with left wing sympathies were tar-
geted and some, including the Congress of American Women (CAW), were forced to dis-
band, having come under the scrutiny of the House Committee on Un-American Activities. 
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 81-1953 (1949) (report by the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities on the Congress of American Women). The CAW was established in 1946 and 
was racially diverse and founded on strong feminist/pacifist principles. However, it was 
aligned to the Women’s International Democratic Federation, an organization which was 
seen as a “front” for the Soviet Union and consequently its members came under enormous 
pressure during the McCarthy years. See Harriet Hyman Alonso, Mayhem and Moderation: 
Women Peace Activists during the McCarthy Era, in NOT JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER 
IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945-1960, at 148 (Joanne Meyerowitz ed., 1994). The history of the 
Women’s International Democratic Federation itself remains buried and only in recent years 
have academics begun to reverse the legacy of the Cold War to surface the histories of 
Second and Third World women’s movements. See, e.g., FRANCISCA DE HAAN, THE 
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION: HISTORY, MAIN AGENDA AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS 1945-1991 (2012); Magdalena Grabowska, Beyond the “Development” Para-
digm: State Socialist Women’s Activism, Transnationalism, and the “Long Sixties,” in WOMEN’S AC-
TIVISM AND “SECOND WAVE” FEMINISM: TRANSNATIONAL HISTORIES 147 (Barbara Molo-
ney & Jennifer Nelson eds., 2017); KRISTEN GHODSEE, SECOND WORLD, SECOND SEX: 
SOCIALIST WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND GLOBAL SOLIDARITY DURING THE COLD WAR 
(2019). Although the Women’s International Democratic Federation was concerned with 
disarmament, few records remain of, for example, the 1962 World Gathering of Women 
for Disarmament convened by the Women’s International Democratic Federation that 
brought together feminist activists from fifty-nine States calling for the ending of nuclear 
testing, the destruction of atomic weapons stockpiles, and the dismantling of military bases 
and withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign territory. WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL DEM-
OCRATIC FEDERATION, WORLD GATHERING OF WOMEN FOR DISARMAMENT (1962). Like-
wise, few records exist on the activities of the European Movement of Women against Nu-
clear Armament.      
133. Archival records and more recent scholarship have revealed the extent of the hos-
tility directed towards feminist peace activist protesting the deployment of nuclear weapons 
by local communities. See, for example, Home Office papers on Powers and Procedures of 











Notwithstanding the hostile domestic environment and escalating Cold 
War tensions, women activists continued to build transnational bonds seek-
ing out issues upon which they could unite. The decision by the UN to des-
ignate 1975 as International Women’s Year and to organize a conference in 
Mexico City around the themes of equality, development, and peace, pre-
sented anti-war activists of different ideological leanings with an opportunity 
to identify common strategic objectives, including disarmament.134 However, 
attempts to place the issue on the main agenda were met with stiff resistance 
by States on the grounds that the subject matter would “politicize” women’s 
issues. Disarmament, it was maintained, was a matter wholly extraneous and 
unrelated to women’s rights.135 Recognizing that at stake was more than 
simply the question of disarmament, but the need to break the cycle of self-
fulfilling marginalization more broadly, activists from WILPF, the Women’s 
International Democratic Federation, and the Jane Addams Peace Associa-
tion joined forces to convene an event in parallel to the main conference. 
Following the event, a joint statement was issued calling for the reallocation 
of military budgets to development aid and the “equitable representation of 
men and women” in international efforts to further disarmament, including 
in the proposed UN Disarmament Conference.136 As a result of intensive 
lobbying by activists, a commitment to “general and complete disarmament” 
was incorporated into the final Declaration.137 Largely due to WILPF’s ef-
forts, disarmament was also integrated into the main agenda in subsequent 
 
134. For a useful overview of the decade, see Irene Tinker & Jane Jaquette, UN Decade 
for Women: Its Impact and Legacy, 15 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 419 (1987). 
135. This view was also shared by many First World women during the Copenhagen 
conference who took the position that political issues detracted from those “common” to 
all women. Nilufer Cagatay, Caren Grown & Aida Santiago, The Nairobi Women’s Conference: 
Toward a Global Feminism?, 12 FEMINIST STUDIES 401, 403 (1986). See also de Haan, who 
offers a damning critique on how “western-oriented feminists, women’s organizations and 
scholars, wittingly or not, contributed to and continue to contribute to that process of dis-
cursively constructing Western or U.S. hegemony in the field of women’s rights.” Francisca 
de Haan & Eugenie Cotton, Pak Chong-ae, and Claudia Jones: Rethinking Transnational Feminism 
and International Politics, 25 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S HISTORY 174, 176 (2013).  
136. WILPF, Women’s International Democratic Federation, & Jane Addams Peace 
Association, Statement of Findings: International Women’s Year Disarmament Seminar 
(May 9, 1975) (on file in the Mildred E. Persinger Collection, Hollins University, Wyndham 
Robertson Library, United Nations World Conferences, Mexico, International Women's 
Year, IWY 1975: UN: IWY Disarmament Conference).  
137. Report of the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, Declaration of 
Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. 











conferences held as part of the UN Decade for Women (1976–85) in Co-
penhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). These incremental steps paved the way 
for the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, not only to ex-
pressly recognize women’s history of activism in calling “for reductions in 
military expenditures worldwide, as well as in international trade and traf-
ficking in and the proliferation of weapons,” but to reframe disarmament as 
integral to the fulfilment of women’s rights.138    
Albeit non-binding, the Platform for Action reinforces the link between 
disarmament and development139 and commits States to reducing “excessive 
military expenditures, trade in arms and investment for arms production and 
acquisition” and to “reallocate funds to social and economic development 
for the advancement of women.”140 In short, disarmament was recast as a 
means to advance women’s de facto equality with men, a move that was 
widely welcomed among activists. That said, the commitment is a modest 
one. As Dianne Otto rightly notes, the goal of reducing “excessive” military 
expenditure is “qualified to the point of meaninglessness by being made sub-
ject to ‘national security considerations’ or ‘legitimate national defence 
needs.’”141   
Although forward-looking, the Platform for Action is also a constant 
reminder of past State failure to advance disarmament. It does so by recalling 
the obligation on States “to work actively towards general and complete dis-
armament under strict and effective international control” and by urging for 
the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty to contribute to 
nuclear disarmament, objectives that had been pledged in other international 
fora over the preceding decades but not acted upon. By the terms of the 
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), States 
were already bound by the legal obligation to advance general and complete 
 
138. Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and Platform 
for Action, ¶ 138, at 58, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996) [hereinafter Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action]; see also Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women: 
Addendum., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (Oct. 27, 1995). These documents were 
endorsed by G.A. Res. 50/203 (Feb. 23, 1996). 
139. For a useful history on UN efforts to link disarmament and development, see 
SPIES, supra note 108, ch. 6. 
140. See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 138, ch. 4, § E (Women and 
Armed Conflict). 
141. Dianne Otto, Holding up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit: A Critical Analysis of the 











disarmament.142 More specifically, Article VI of the NPT requires States to 
“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation 
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on 
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective in-
ternational control.”143 These three obligations were reaffirmed in the Final 
Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Dis-
armament144 and other UN reports endorsed by the General Assembly. Yet, 
 
142. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. 6, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. It entered into force on March 5, 1970 and was 
extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995. A total of 191 States are Parties, including the five 
nuclear-weapon States. Although welcoming the adoption of the treaty, WILPF sent a letter 
to the two co-Chairs of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee expressing profound 
disappointment that the treaty did not require the nuclear-weapon States to “provide for 
speedy measures of effective disarmament.” WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR 
PEACE AND FREEDOM, 17TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 74 (1968). The adoption of 
the treaty paved way for the UN’s Disarmament Decade (1969–1979).    
143. In elaborating on the scope and effect of this obligation, the International Court 
of Justice in its advisory opinion stated,  
 
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the 
obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result—nuclear disarmament 
in all its aspects—by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of nego-
tiations on the matter in good faith.  
This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the 
182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other 
words, the vast majority of the international community.  
Virtually the whole of this community appears moreover to have been involved when 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly concerning nuclear disarmament have 
repeatedly been unanimously adopted. Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete 
disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, necessitates the co-operation of all States. 
 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 
99–100 (July 8). 
144. The Final Document states:  
 
The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and 
complete disarmament under effective international control. . . . Progress toward this ob-
jective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the 
arms race and on genuine measure of disarmament. . . .  
Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament . . . have the highest 
priority. 
  
G.A. Res. A/RES/S-10/2, ¶¶ 19–20 (June 28, 1978). Although some nuclear-weapon States 
have suggested that general and complete disarmament is a precondition to nuclear disarma-
ment, this view is not reflected in the Final Document, nor is it a view shared by the majority 











despite repeated pronouncements,145 there were no serious negotiations to 
advance disarmament and throughout the Cold War period States continued 
to grow their nuclear capabilities, ostensibly to protect national security.  
The bilateral and multilateral agreements adopted during the Cold War 
period did not secure any reduction in arms nor establish a coherent and 
universally applicable “system for the regulation of armaments,” as set forth 
in Article 26 of the UN Charter.146 Rather, what emerged was a fragmented 
 
145. For example, see the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations in which States un-
dertook to “pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty 
on general and complete disarmament.” G.A. Res. 2625, annex, ¶ 1, Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States 
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). Two further Spe-
cial Sessions on Disarmament were held in 1982 and 1988 but with few outcomes. The 
General Assembly has been calling for a fourth session since 1995.  
146. See, for example, the UK Ministry of Defence publication “Arms Control and 
Security” which stated: 
 
much effort has been put into the arms control process since the Second World War. There 
have been some notable successes: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1972]; the interim Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Treaty [1972]; the [1963] Partial Test Ban and [1968] Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaties; the [1971] Biological Weapons Convention; and several other lesser 
agreement. But despite all efforts, very little has been achieved in the way of actual arms reductions. Most 
agreements have either confirmed existing force levels or have been designed to prevent 
the development of completely new areas of arms technology. 
  
John Nott, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982 (Apr. 5, 1982) (on file with The Na-
tional Archives, Kew, CAB 129/214/9) (emphasis added). This point was emphasized in 
the Final Document of the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament 
which stated:  
 
No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of reduction of armaments. . . . 
Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or 
eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the [biological weapons convention] and ex-
cluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate 
only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures 
have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. 
  











body of treaties which operated to advantage the strategic interests of mili-
tarily advanced States147 and, through the notion of non-proliferation, to de-
fer, in perpetuity, the prospect of nuclear disarmament.148 The disjuncture 
between de jure progress and de facto change and the disconnect between 
rhetoric and practice extended to women’s equal participation in multilateral 
fora concerned with weapons and disarmament.149 Impervious to normative 
change, the field continued to be dominated by men, despite the obligation 
of States to take all appropriate measures to ensure women’s equal partici-
pation in political life at national and international levels, including in inter-
national organizations pursuant to the 1979 Convention on the Elimination 
 
147. Without the support of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that 
the biological or chemical weapons conventions would have been agreed. Moreover, as 
Mathews and McCormack note,  
 
the principal motivation for concluding the [CWC] had less to do with the deleterious con-
sequences of the weapons from a humanitarian point of view, and more to do with other 
strategic security factors—most importantly the growing concerns about horizontal prolif-
eration of chemical weapons and the recognition by both the USA and Russia that they did 
not need to retain their chemical weapons stockpiles following the Cold War. 
  
Robert J. Mathews & Timothy L.H. McCormack, The Influence of Humanitarian Principles in the 
Negotiation of Arms Control Treaties, 81 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 331, 
339 (1999).  
148. The practice of nuclear-weapon States has been to interpret Article VI of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons narrowly to mean that it contains no 
legal requirement to conclude negotiations notwithstanding the pronouncement by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion. See Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. Legal experts have also been critical of this interpretation, 
as exemplified by the 2004 International Law Association report which stated: “the demise 
of arms control and disarmament efforts would be contrary to the ICJ advisory opinion, 
which has clearly identified an obligation for nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith 
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under 
strict and effective control.” COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
LEGAL REGULATION FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ¶ 5 (2004). For an alterna-
tive view, see Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Art. VI of the Treaty on 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 401, 403 (2007).  
149. The absence of women is indicative of a failure on the part of States to meet 
minimum non-discrimination obligations under the Charter and other international human 
rights instruments, including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-











of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).150 Women con-
tinued to remain in the minority and, when included, generally consigned to 
positions scripted female with little decision-making power.151 At the inter-
section with sex and gender, exclusion founded on race and ethnicity served 
to doubly silence and exclude, thereby translating into laws and policies, na-
tional and international, that were systematically failing to take account of 
women’s lived experiences and, most significantly, their views on what con-
stituted insecurity and how to tackle it. 
For anti-war feminists, the Cold War had exposed the extent to which 
the age-old forces of militarism and patriarchy—transcending political differ-
ence—operated in tandem to exclude alternative voices and to block mean-
ingful progress towards universal disarmament which legal inclusion alone, 
even if actualized, could not surmount.152 After all, the enormous efforts to 
dispel State claims around the economic and social costs of general and com-
plete disarmament had delivered no progress;153 studies on the social and 
 
150. Id. Article 7 of CEDAW states:  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on 
equal terms with men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be 
eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of 
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform 
all public functions at all levels of government; (c) To participate in non-governmental or-
ganizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country. 
  
Article 8 of CEDAW requires States Parties to “take all appropriate measures to ensure to 
women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to rep-
resent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of inter-
national organizations.”  
151. There were however exceptions. For example, Inga Thorsson, who was Under-
Secretary of State at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Swedish 
Disarmament Delegation to the United Nations, was appointed president of the First Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1976. For an illuminating insight, see the inter-
view with Thorsson. Inga Thorsson, 8 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 16, 37 (1986). 
152. Feminists had long cautioned that equality would require change “not only in law, 
but also in social customs and beliefs.” Margaret Bruce, Work of the United Nations Relating to 
the Status of Women, 2 REVUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT 
COMPARE 365, 365 (1971). 
153. By the mid-1960s, macro-economic arguments grounded in Keynesian economics 
(that the reduction in public expenditure would translate into high unemployment) had all 
but been refuted. The Consultative Group on Economic and Social Consequences of Dis-
armament established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1516 had reached the 












human cost of weapons were acknowledged but indefinitely postponed;154 
legal arguments dismissed for being non-justiciable;155 and ideological differ-
ences aside, nuclear-weapon States would regularly resort to identical claims 
when expedient to do so.156 For antiwar feminists, it had become all too clear 
that only wholescale transformative change would suffice. With elites across 
the political spectrum continuing to justify the accumulation of greater and 
more destructive stockpiles of weapons on the basis of national security, 
 
disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures,” and that 
“there should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources 
now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the 
improvement of world economic and social conditions.” Quoted in U.N. Secretary-General, 
Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament iv, U.N. Doc. E/3593/Rev.1 (1962). The Gen-
eral Assembly subsequently adopted a declaration on the conversion to peaceful needs of 
the resources released by disarmament. G.A. Res 1837 (Dec. 18, 1962). Although the Gen-
eral Assembly was to adopt further resolutions on the matter and commission the Secretary-
General to undertake further study (see, e.g., Secretary-General, Economic and Social Aspects of 
Disarmament, U.N. Doc. E/3898/Rev. 1 (Oct. 7, 1964), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DIS-
ARMAMENT 1964, at 256 (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ed., 1965)), little 
progress materialized. WILPF had long pressed for further studies to highlight the benefits 
of reallocating military resources to further social development. See Gertrude Baer, Report on 
Work with and at the United Nations 24, 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 115. 
154. U.N. Secretary-General, Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Mil-
itary Expenditures, U.N. Doc. A/32/88/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1977). See also G.A. Res. 2667 (Dec. 
7, 1970); G.A. Res. 2831 (Dec. 16, 1971); G.A. Res. 3075 (Dec. 6, 1973); G.A. Res. 3462 
(Dec. 11, 1975).  
155. See, e.g., Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). The case involved the deployment of 160 cruise missiles at a Royal Air 
Force military base in the United Kingdom. It was dismissed by the court on the grounds 
that the issue raised was “a non-justiciable political question.” Id. at 1336. It added that “The 
courts are simply incapable of determining the effect of the missile deployment on world 
peace.” Id. at 1338.  
156. Justifying Soviet nuclear testing in 1961, Premier Khrushchev said:  
 
It is not radioactive fallout that has to be feared but the falling of the actual nuclear weapon. 
. . . If you balance the harm of nuclear tests to the health of the people against the conse-
quences of the military application of nuclear weapons, it will be obvious to everyone what 
choice has been put before mankind today. . . . The Government of the U.S.S.R. would not 
have fulfilled its duty if it did not fittingly look after the security of the Soviet people. 
  
Quoted in Howard J. Taubenfeld, Nuclear Testing and International Law, 16 SOUTHWESTERN 
LAW JOURNAL 365, 366 (1962). Likewise, President Kennedy, although “deeply regret[ting]” 
additional testing, suggested that it was necessary to balance the risk to health against “the 
hazards to hundreds of millions of lives which would be created by any relative decline” in 











feminist activists and scholars increasingly directed their attention to the sys-
tems of power and to the pivotal role of gender in sustaining both militarism 
and patriarchy that were, in turn, perpetuating and normalizing the demand 
for weapons.157 The utility and significance of gender as an analytic prism 
through which to expose the mechanisms of both militarism and patriarchy, 
and as a way in which to dismantle and transform social relations, was not 
lost on feminist scholars, notwithstanding diverse ontological and epistemo-
logical viewpoints and differences in disciplinary traditions.158 As an analytic 
tool, gender would also provide a supplementary entry point through which 
 
157. See generally CYNTHIA ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME YOU? THE MILITARIZATION 
OF WOMEN’S LIVES (1983); CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING 
FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1989). Scales called for militarism and the 
structures of militarism to be on the feminist agenda given the “perverse symbiotic relation-
ship between militarism and gender oppression.” Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and 
Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron, 12 HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 25, 26 (1989). 
Although some earlier feminist scholarship equated militarism with patriarchy, suggesting 
“to be male is synonymous with strength, aggression and the will to dominate and do vio-
lence to others,” anti-war feminists were quick to caution against dualist thinking for being 
“dangerous” and for disregarding how particular femininities are needed to sustain milita-
rism. Bell Hooks, Feminism and Militarism: A Comment, 23 WOMEN’S STUDIES QUARTERLY 
58, 59 (1995). Writing in 1915, Jane Addams too recognized that “the belief that a woman 
is against war simply because she is a woman and not a man cannot be substantiated. In 
every country there are women who believe that war is inevitable and righteous.” Jane Ad-
dams, Women and Internationalism, in WOMEN AT THE HAGUE 128 (1915).  
158. “Gender,” as Squires observes, “is a complex and contested concept.” JUDITH 
SQUIRES, GENDER IN POLITICAL THEORY 54 (2013). Over the years, gender has been used 
in different ways although its origins as a critical prism of analysis can be traced to the 
writings of Simone de Beauvoir and her radical insight, articulated in 1949, that “[o]ne is not 
born, but rather becomes, woman.” SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 301 (1973). 
As Squires notes, de Beauvoir’s existentialist account of social construction “offered a 
sweeping critique of biological determinism” creating the intellectual space to distinguish 
between sex and gender, with the latter being the cultural interpretation of sex as a biological 
category. SQUIRES, supra at 55. Butler argues that this distinction opened the way to “debunk 
the claim that anatomy is destiny”; to expose the myth that a binary gender system has no 
ontological necessity; to tackle social oppression founded on discrimination; and to trans-
form social interaction. Judith Butler, Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex, 72 
YALE FRENCH STUDIES 35, 35 (1986). Building on these insights, feminist scholarship has 
traced the manifold ways in which gender operates to construct identities—individual and 
collective—that are contingent on time and location. Other work has explored gender as a 
way of structuring relations of power. See, e.g., ANNE SISSON RUNYAN & V. SPIKE PETER-
SON, GLOBAL GENDER ISSUES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2015). Still others have investi-
gated gender as a symbolic system that functions to shape all aspects of life, including at the 
intersection with other axes of oppression, such as race. See BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A 











to contest the militarized State-centric conception of security, presenting the 
possibility to fundamentally reframe the discourse around weapons.  
 
IV. REFRAMING  
 
“How then are we to understand your problem, and if we cannot, how can we answer 
your question, how to prevent war? The answer based upon our experience and our 
psychology—Why fight?—is not an answer of any value.” 
Virginia Woolf, 1938159 
 
By the 1990s there was a growing body of feminist research revealing the 
complex ways in which gender worked to shape identities, relations of 
power, discourse, the production of knowledge, symbols, material objects, 
policy, and law.160 This work enriched earlier feminist scholarship which had 
traced how patriarchy as a form of power privileging male domination oper-
ated through gender systems to constitute, order, and shape social and cul-
tural practices and norms.161 Institutionalized through the law and further 
entrenched through the public/private divide,162 gender systems, it was 
 
159. WOOLF, supra note 10, at 6. 
160. On critiquing the objectivity of knowledge production, see, for example, DISCOV-
ERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHOD-
OLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (Sandra Harding & Merril Hintikka eds., 1983). 
Feminist historians exploring ways in which gender operated to erase women from history 
and how to redress this structural silencing embarked on the political project of writing 
women back into history. See, e.g., Joan W. Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Anal-
ysis, 91 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1053 (1986); Joan W. Scott, History and Differ-
ence, DAEDALUS, Fall 1987, at 93. International law scholars likewise began to trace the gen-
dered discursive patterns and assumptions within their discipline to account for and explain 
the law’s silences to challenge the law’s impartiality. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chin-
kin & Shelly Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 613 (1991). As Gardam notes, “much of the feminist project in law has 
been to demonstrate the fallacy of the objectivity of the law, to reveal its underlying assump-
tions and value judgments as made by, and in the interests of, men.” Judith Gardam, A 
Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEAR 
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265, 268 (1992). 
161. See, for example, Pateman who reflects on the contested understandings of patriarchy. 
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1991). There is now a significant body of 
literature on patriarchy, but for a recent comment on international law and patriarchy, see 
Cassandra Mudgway, Smashing the Patriarchy: Why International Law Should Be Doing More, LSE 
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/10/07/smashing-the-patriarchy/.      
162. Feminists have at least since the eighteenth century questioned the divide between 
public and private that has enabled the privileging of the former. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, 











maintained, function to establish dichotomies to differentiate between male 
and female activities and roles and, in that process, create power hierarchies 
privileging attributes coded “male” over “female.”163 These insights exposed 
the extent to which gendered norms shape human behavior, interaction, and 
value systems that have little or no relationship with sexed bodies and iden-
tities and thus provided a richer understanding of the history of women’s 
political exclusion as rooted in constructed gender identities and binary sys-
tems founded on social and cultural practices contingent on time and loca-
tion. In other words, gender could not be understood as a static category any 
more than gender identities be limited to singular definitions of masculinity 
or femininity.164 
In particular, it was the scholarship being generated by feminist interna-
tional relations scholars who were directing their scrutiny to the gendered 
 
163. While feminist work has detailed how gendered hierarchies are justified by refer-
ence to biological/natural determinism by those in power to confer on themselves certain 
privileges, other scholars have demonstrated how the very same claims are made to justify 
racial hierarchies. Feminists have now long insisted that gender as a category cannot be 
abstracted from a particular context since it is always only one component in a matrix of 
interrelationships in which other systems of identities and axes of oppression, such as race 
and class, operate concurrently. As Bartlett notes:  
 
Although feminists have been guilty of ethnocentrism and all too often fail to recognize 
that women's lives are heterogeneous, that women who have had similar experiences may 
disagree about political agendas, and that women's gender is only one of many sources of 
identity, gender remains a category that can help to analyze and improve our world. 
 
Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 829, 835 (1990). 
164. Feminist scholars have been at pains to stress that patriarchal systems are adept at 
spawning different forms and types of masculinities and femininities that dominate, in par-
ticular, places and in time. See, e.g., CYNTHIA COCKBURN, ANTIMILITARISM: POLITICAL AND 
GENDER DYNAMICS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS (2012); CYNTHIA COCKBURN, FROM WHERE 
WE STAND: WAR, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2007). In 2010, the 
CEDAW Committee elaborated on this relational conception of “gender” to mean  
 
socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social 
and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationship 
between women and men and in the distribution of power and rights favouring men and 
disadvantaging women. This social positioning of women and men is affected by political, 
economic, cultural, social, religious, ideological and environmental factors and can be 
changed by culture, society and community. 
  
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommenda-
tion No 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 











dimensions of global politics, inter-State relations, and war as a system which 
opened up new avenues through which to understand the intersection of 
patriarchy and militarism.165 In contrast to mainstream work, feminists 
looked to the local as much as the global, revealing how gender operated to 
structure and shape relations of power, producing difference and normaliz-
ing hierarchies between States and within States, between men and women, 
and among men and women in war and peacetime.166 Most notably, Cynthia 
Enloe’s work tracing the ways in which masculinities and femininities were 
being manipulated to service militarism167 and normalize certain forms of 
violence,168 including war, was instrumental in inspiring further work map-
 
165. See ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME YOU?, supra note 157. See also V. Spike Peter-
son, Transgressing Boundaries: Theories of Knowledge, Gender, and International Relations, 21 MILLEN-
NIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 183 (1992); J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECU-
RITY (1992); BETTY REARDON, SEXISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM (1985). As with patriarchy, 
there is a large body of literature on militarism. For a useful collection of papers by main-
stream international relations scholars, see MILITARISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(Anna Stavrianakis & Jan Selby eds., 2013).  
166. What this scholarship was showing was that the ability of States to engage in war-
fare is contingent on the creation of a “war system”—from training (men) to fight and kill, 
to equipping them with the appropriate tools, to channeling resources into research and 
development, manufacturing, transport, meeting their individual and collective needs, and 
in shaping masculinities (whether as fighter, as administrator, as scientist, as clinician) and 
femininities (as colleague, as supporter, as provider) in a manner conducive to war-fighting. 
A gender analysis enabled interrogating how masculinities and femininities are constructed 
to enable warfare, challenging the claim that men are biologically or naturally war-like. See 
also JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER: HOW GENDER SHAPES THE WAR SYSTEM 
AND VICE VERSA (2001).     
167. As Enloe notes, “militarization may privilege masculinity, but it does so by manip-
ulating the meanings of both femininity and masculinity.” CYNTHIA ENLOE, MANOEUVRES: 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MILITARIZING WOMEN'S LIVES 289 (2000). See also 
Riedi, supra note 25, on gender politics and militarism in the context of the Boer War.  
168. Over the years the question of “male violence” has been the topic of much study. 
As Messner cautions,  
 
the term “male violence” tends to suggest that violence is an essential feature of maleness, 
rather than a socially-learned feature of certain kind of masculinity. Indeed, concrete social-
scientific examinations of violence show that there is no convincing evidence that men are 
genetically or hormonally predisposed to violent behaviour. In fact, the weight of evidence 
supports the contention that most males are not comfortable committing acts of violence. 













ping how patriarchy linked militarized femininities to militarized masculini-
ties sustaining the domination of certain brands of masculinity that, in turn, 
fueled the demand for weapons at personal and inter-State levels.169   
In parallel with this work and under the influence of poststructuralist 
theory and the linguistic turn, feminist scholars were exploring how gender 
operated in thought, speech, and writing through webs of metaphors, eu-
phemism, and reasoning. This intellectual shift created the potential—
through the disruption, deconstruction, and reconstruction of the discourse 
around weapons—to pave the way for a radical change in practice, no more 
so than in the sphere of nuclear weapons. In this context, it was Carol Cohn’s 
fieldwork that broke new ground, revealing the ways in which the gendered 
discourse around nuclear weapons functioned to legitimate and promote the 
development, possession, and use of such weapons, posing obstacles to dis-
armament.170 Cohn’s work was pivotal in surfacing the gendered language, 
concepts, and symbolism prevalent in the nuclear weapons field, including 
the manifold ways in which the possession of such weapons systems were 
systematically equated with the “attributes” commonly coded masculine, in-
cluding, for example, strength, sexual virility, rationality, objectivity, and ab-
straction.171   
 
Michael Messner, When Bodies are Weapons: Masculinity and Violence in Sport, 25 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 203, 205 (1990). 
169. There is a growing body of feminist research engaging with “militarized masculin-
ities,” understood as processes of socialization that are enacted and performed. For a 
thoughtful reflection on anti-militarist feminist scholarship in the context of the Security 
Council’s Women, Peace and Security agenda, see Hannah Wright, Masculinities Perspectives: 
Advancing a Radical Women, Peace and Security Agenda?, 22 INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST JOUR-
NAL OF POLITICS 652 (2020). For an analysis sketching the intimate relationship between 
enactments of masculinities and the wielding of weapons, see Henri Myrttinen, Disarming 
Masculinities, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM: WOMEN, MEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 37 (2003).  
170. Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, 12 SIGNS 687 
(1987). Cohn’s research was undertaken in a period when the nuclear arms race had reached 
a level where military superiority no longer had any meaning and when deterrence theory 
dominated mainstream scholarship.  
171. When India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader 
Balasaheb Thackeray stated, “we had to prove that we are not eunuchs.” Quoted in Cohn & 
Ruddick, supra note 7, at 19. Likewise, more recently, in a twitter exchange between Donald 
Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the former tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, 
but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” Lauren 
Gambino, Donald Trump Boasts That His Nuclear Button Is Bigger Than Kim Jong-un's, GUARDIAN 












Uncovering the gendered symbolic value and meaning attached to weap-
ons was seen as a critical step towards challenging the underlying rationale 
that sustained the valorization of weapons, most notably nuclear. A gender 
analysis not only revealed how the possession of nuclear weapons was inti-
mately conjoined with militarized masculinities wielding a powerful symbolic 
value in the construction of the role of men in society from the local to the 
global level but the extent to which the gendered discourse facilitated the 
development and use of nuclear weapons.172 Clinical, technical, formulaic, ab-
stract, and detached language, again coded masculine, permeated the nuclear 
weapons field—whether among political elites or those engaged in the de-
velopment of such weapons—making it possible to subordinate considera-
tion of, or to elide, the material, experienced, and corporal consequences of 
their use. In short, the gendered discourse turned what should have been the 
unthinkable into a rational prospect.173 
For anti-war feminist scholars, unraveling the gendered symbolic value 
of weapons, their intimate association with, and pivotal part in constructing, 
patriarchal power and models of militarized masculinities and femininities 
was a critical step toward securing transformative change. Recognizing weap-
ons as more than simply the tools through which coercive power and vio-
lence was applied but deconstructing the co-constitutive relationship be-
tween weapons and gender opened up the possibility of developing mean-
ingful counter-strategies to dismantle the obstacles to disarmament. Thus, in 
contrast to mainstream scholarship which continued to fall back on the age-
old claim that “[men] do not fight because they have arms. They have arms 
because they deem it necessary to fight”174—admitting no room to surmount 
 
ts-nuclear- button-bigger-kim-jong-un. For anti-war feminists, these overtly sexualized pub-
lic pronouncements and exchanges served to reinforce feminist analyses pointing to the 
pivotal role of gender in perpetuating the demand for nuclear weapons. The essence of 
masculinity could be defined and measured by the possession of the ultimate weapon of 
destruction.  
172. Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill & Sara Ruddick, The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Paper No. 38 
(2006)), https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/the_relevance_of_gender_for_ 
eliminating_weapons_of_mass_destruction_-_cohn_hill_ruddick.pdf.  
173. Cohn, supra note 170, at 715.  
174. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER AND PEACE 115 (1967). Throughout the Cold War period, mainstream scholarship, 
most notably the field of International Relations and Security Studies, was dominated by the 
realist school and later by the emergence of neorealist approaches. The dominance of this 












the stalemate—feminist scholarship provided an alternative entry point to 
reframe and rejuvenate the disarmament debate and, at the same time, to 
inform and shape the trajectory of feminist activism.  
As with other critical traditions, anti-war scholars have also been critical 
of the political strategy of non-proliferation, most notably in its existing ap-
plication to nuclear weapons.175 That the effect of the regime as elaborated 
in the NPT is to legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons by the original 
nuclear-weapon States and to sanction, by default, a deviation from the prin-
ciple of sovereign equality, thereby normalizing a hierarchy176 further en-
trenched through international law is a common criticism.177 Feminist schol-
arship has taken this critique one step further to expose the extent to which 
 
military complex, she added “academic.” MYRDAL, supra note 119. See also Hans J. Morgen-
thau, Does Disarmament Mean Peace?, in ARMS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 
417, 422 (Milton L. Rakove ed., 1972). Bull likewise reasons that the competition for arms 
is a function of the competition for power and “a mutually satisfactory settlement of the 
power contest is a precondition for disarmament.” He continues, “the fact that the arms 
race contributes to political tension does not diminish the difficulty that it cannot be brought 
to an end without the ending of this tension.” Hedley Bull, Disarmament and the International 
System, in THEORIES OF PEACE AND SECURITY: A READER IN CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC 
THOUGHT 138 (John Garnett ed., 1970).  
175. Non-proliferation is a term dating back to the Cold War that is understood to 
apply to weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear—
rather than conventional weapons. Developed as a strategy that sought to maintain the sta-
tus quo and the extant balance of power, non-proliferation, as a standalone concept, does 
not entail the reduction in weapons and implicitly allows for a distinction to be made be-
tween legal and illegal possession and use.   
176. As White points out, this hierarchical stratification of power is duplicated in other 
conventions such as the Genocide Convention (which extends to the members of the Se-
curity Council the authority to decide on whether genocide was being committed) and the 
Rome Statute (empowering the Security Council to refer and defer cases). See Nigel White, 
Understanding Nuclear Deterrence Within the International Constitutional Architecture, in 5 NUCLEAR 
NON-PROLIFERATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR NUCLEAR DE-
TERRENCE AND SECURITY 107 (Jonathan L. Black-Branch & Dieter Fleck eds., 2020).  
177. The NPT is often referred to be a “grand bargain” between nuclear-weapon States 
and non-nuclear-weapon States and to that extent parallels the unequal distribution of 
power upon which the UN Charter is founded. The deviation from equality was agreed to, 
ostensibly on the basis that the nuclear-weapon States are to be trusted with such privileges 
in exchange for security, although the paradox is that it was the policies of the permanent 
members of the Security Council which increased international insecurity through the arms 
race. Although the United Kingdom has tellingly described the NPT as “the most widely 
adhered to arms control treaty in history” it is difficult to see how such a conclusion can be 












the discourse is steeped in gendered rhetoric. As Carol Cohn and Sara Rud-
dick maintain, it is not uncommon for the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council to be depicted as the protectors of security, always rational, ob-
jective, responsible, technologically advanced, and coded masculine versus 
non-nuclear-weapon States that are portrayed either as in need of protection 
or irrational, emotional, irresponsible, and technologically backward and of-
tentimes coded feminine.178 These narratives have, in turn, become the basis 
for consolidating the status quo. Through their scholarship, Claire Duncan-
son and Catherine Eschle have likewise highlighted the ways in which nu-
clear-weapon States have persistently invoked a gendered rhetoric to justify 
the retention of nuclear capabilities, albeit one that relies on redefined mas-
culinities in a post-Cold War environment.179 
The changing nature of armed violence that unfolded with the end of 
the Cold War drew in a new generation of feminists scholars whose focus 
has been primarily on small arms and light weapons (SALW), corresponding 
to a shift in attention within the UN system from weapons of mass destruc-
tion to the proliferation of SALW.180 This research traced the gender dimen-
sions of SALW to show how their proliferation was giving rise to different 
and disproportionate insecurities for women and girls, most especially in 
 
notes of March 8, 1996 from the Ministry of Defence to the office of the Prime Minister 
(on file with The National Archives, Kew, PREM 19/6222). Although nuclear-weapon 
States have continued to maintain that pursuant to the NPT they are legally entitled to pos-
sess nuclear weapons, their obligation is to work towards the elimination of their weapons, 
a requirement that was strengthened at the 2000 NPT Review Conference with the com-
mitment to “an unequivocal undertaking . . . to accomplish the total elimination of their 
nuclear arsenals.” 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Review of the Operation of the Treaty, Taking into 
Account the Decisions and the Resolution Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference 14, 
U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II) (2000).  
178. Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass De-
struction, in ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 7, at 405.  
179. Duncanson & Eschle, supra note 7. In the cyber world, it is the “techno geek” who 
is central to the redefined conception of masculinity.  
180. By 1995, the UN’s attention and resources were shifting from weapons of mass 
destruction to the proliferation of SALW and anti-personnel landmines in the context of 
non-international armed conflict. The need for greater regulation of anti-personnel 
landmines was also a matter being addressed by States, albeit, in the view of many, inade-
quately, in the context of the Convention on Certain Convention Weapons. Report of the 
Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace 14: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on 












post-conflict environments;181 that the proliferation of SALW and with it the 
creation of weaponized cultures were a product of, and reinforce, patriarchal 
hierarchies and militarism; and that, as with weapons of mass destruction, 
SALWs are “the embodiment of violent, often militarized models of mascu-
linity.”182 Importantly, this research questioned the traditional distinction be-
tween war and peace and conceptions of security wedded to the territorial 
State which was failing to capture the everyday violence that women were 
experiencing in weaponized societies.  
In parallel with this work, feminist international relations scholars were 
tracing the links between inter-State security and gendered insecurities “to 
draw attention to the extent to which gender hierarchies themselves [were] a 
source of domination and thus an obstacle to a truly comprehensive defini-
tion of security.”183 Feminist scholars were not alone in urging for a more 
expansive understanding of security that placed the individual’s security at 
the core of the inquiry rather than simply the security of the State.184 While 
earlier iterations of “human security” can be traced to renewed efforts during 
the early 1980s by the UN to press for the redirection of resources from 
military expenditure to development,185 it was the 1994 Human Develop-
 
181. For example, see the 2011 Secretary-General’s report on women, peace and secu-
rity, which states, “gender-based violence is more prevalent and more severe when guns are 
readily available.” U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. 
S/2011/598 (Sept. 29, 2011). See also GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DE-
VELOPMENT STUDIES, GENEVA, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2014: WOMEN AND GUNS (2014).  
182. Henri Myrttinen, Disarming Masculinities, 4 DISARMAMENT FORUM: WOMEN, MEN, 
PEACE AND SECURITY 37, 41 (2003). 
183. TICKNER, supra note 165, at 53. Scholars asked whether social organizations—not 
least the State—were capable of delivering on an authentic meaningful security if they were 
founded on relationships of domination and subordination, whether by gender, race, or 
class. Feminist activists had, at least since the UN Decade of Women, questioned the nar-
row, militarized State-centric conception of security. See, e.g., Inga Thorsson, Disarmament 
and Development, WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 23RD IN-
TERNATIONAL CONGRESS (1986).  
184. The discourse around security “would appear to have colonized our minds and to 
have subjugated other ways of understandings relations among states.” Carol Cohn, Emas-
culating America’s Linguistic Deterrent, in ROCKING THE SHIP OF STATE 154 (Adrienne Harris 
et al. eds., 1989). 
185. Proposals for linking disarmament with development have been aired since the 
1950s, prompted largely by the General Assembly pursuant to its mandate under Article 26 













ment Report that catapulted the idea of “human security” onto the interna-
tional agenda, injecting new life into antiwar scholarship and activism.186 In 
particular, the report called for a change in the concept of security from an 
exclusive stress on State security to a much greater stress on people’s secu-
rity, from security through armaments to security through human develop-
ment, and from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental 
security. This re-conceptualization of security not only served as the theo-
 
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security 
with the least diversion for armament of the world’s human and economic resources, the 
Security Council shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Mem-
bers of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of arma-
ments. 
  
However, it was the increase in military expenditure in comparison to gross national product 
growth among Third World countries during the 1970s and 1980s that prompted renewed 
interest in the linkage and that shaped the thematic direction of the disarmament debate, 
paralleling the broader international focus on development. See also supra notes 153 and 154. 
The General Assembly held two special sessions on Disarmament and Development (1978 
and 1982) and convened an international conference in 1987. See International Conference 
on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Report of the Conference, ¶ 22, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.130/39 (Sept. 22, 1987). During this period, WILPF also continued 
to actively link disarmament and development, with the difference that activists advocated 
for the reallocation of resources to be targeted to measures to address gender inequality. See 
WILPF’s twentieth international congress in 1977 on the theme of “Disarmament and De-
velopment, Women’s Priority: Building a World Without Weapons or Want.” WOMEN’S 
INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, 20TH INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS (1977). As the WHO had done so in the early 1950s in respect of nuclear weapons, 
throughout the Cold War period international financial institutions recused themselves from 
discussions pertaining to arms reduction for being a “sensitive and political” issue. DEVESH 
KAPUR, JOHN LEWIS, & RICHARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 
533 (1997).  
186. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 1994: NEW DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN SECURITY (1994). The report noted that not-
withstanding the decline in global military spending between 1987 and 1994 the reductions 
in military spending had not been redirected towards human development. For a critical 
reflection on the concept of human security, see CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MARY KALDOR, 











retical foothold for the emergence of the idea of “humanitarian disarma-
ment”187 but in that process brought together different constituencies of ac-
tors, including anti-war feminists, to unite to work towards advancing those 
shared goals.188   
For anti-war feminists, the concept of humanitarian disarmament pre-
sented an opportunity to contest and reshape international law’s trajectory 
as introduced at the 1899 Peace Conference when, much to the disappoint-
ment of feminist peace activists, the failure to advance disarmament had in-
stead paved the way for the development of IHL. Anti-war feminists have 
for the most part remained skeptical of IHL’s potential to “protect”189 let 
alone further disarmament, even partial, given that its primary concern is to 
regulate the use of weapons in war through the two “cardinal” principles of 
IHL, distinction and unnecessary suffering.190 Distinction, which translates 
 
187. At the international level, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
helped to reposition debates within a human security framework by launching a project in 
2004 on “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Making Multilateral Negotiations Work.” 
For a useful analysis on the history of and thinking on humanitarian disarmament, see Bon-
nie Docherty, Ending Civilian Suffering: The Purpose, Provisions, and Promise of Humanitarian Dis-
armament Law, 15 AUSTRIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL & EUROPEAN LAW 7 (2010); 
Richard Slade, Robert Tickner & Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Protecting Humanity from the Catastrophic 
Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons: Reframing the Debate Towards the Humanitarian 
Impact, 97 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 731 (2015). 
188. The 1899 Peace Conference may have paved the way for a wholly new model of 
civil society engagement in the shaping of international law, but humanitarian disarmament 
has given rise to a new model of treaty-making involving coalitions of international non-gov-
ernmental organizations and like-minded States working together to secure new treaties to 
ban landmines and cluster munitions. Thus, in contrast to earlier models where international 
non-governmental organizations lobbied States to initiate and secure changes in law, this 
new model is grounded in law-making from the margins to the center. In other words, the 
line between influencing the content and direction of law and the power to create law has 
been disrupted.     
189. See, for example, the Statement by the Disarmament Committee, supra note 73 
(“We have no belief in the possibility of humanising warfare nor defending civilian popula-
tions . . . from modern methods of waging war.”).  
190. The principle of unnecessary suffering is traced to the St. Petersburg Declaration, 
which condemned the use of weapons “which uselessly aggravate the suffering of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable.” Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. 
T.S. 297, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474. The International Court of Justice de-
scribed these two principles as “cardinal” in its 1996 advisory opinion. Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8). For a feminist 












into the principle of discrimination in assessing the lawfulness of a weapon 
per se, may have played some part in prohibiting chemical and biological 
weapons,191 but, for critical feminists, its inadequacy was laid bare in respect 
of nuclear weapons.192 Moreover, feminist critique was hampered by the fact 
that the principle of unnecessary suffering—the measure by which weapons 
could be deemed lawful or not—was understood to apply exclusively to the 
effects of weapons on combatants on the basis that IHL prohibits attacks 
on the civilian population by virtue of the principle of distinction.193 The 
paradox was that IHL’s dichotomized structure and mode of reasoning func-
tioned to suppress consideration of its stated ambition—humanitarian pro-
tection. More generally, feminist legal scholars remained reticent to engage 
with IHL given its agnosticism towards the practice of collective violence 
and an anxiety that, by integrating gender into the fabric of the law, the le-
gitimacy of resorting to violence in the first place would be reinforced, albeit 
indirectly. 
 
Armed Conflict, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND CONFLICT (Fionnuala Ni Aolain 
et al., eds. 2018).  
191. Humanitarian concerns have not as a rule been the primary motivation for States 
to further arms control. See Mathews & McCormack, supra note 147. 
192. See the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear 
weapons, where the court could only conclude that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, 
and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 105(2)(E). 
193. This interpretation is supported by the text of the relevant provisions in the trea-
ties, State practice, and the ICRC. The origins of the prohibition on weapons that cause 
“superfluous injury” or “unnecessary suffering” date to the agreements entered into by 
States attending the 1899 Peace Conference. Article 23(e) of the regulations annexed to the 
1899 Hague Convention II prohibits the use of “arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
art. 23(e), annexed to Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403. The prohibition was reaffirmed at the 
second Peace Conference with the adoption of the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Article 22 states “the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,” while Article 23 prohibits the use of “poison 
or poisoned weapons” and “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering.” Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 22, 23, 
annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. The prohibition was once again codified in the form of 
Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 











By contrast, anti-war feminists have embraced humanitarian disarma-
ment as a concept and method. On a conceptual level, it introduced the pos-
sibility to consider the impact of weapons on all persons (irrespective of sta-
tus) at all times (thereby disrupting the oftentimes unhelpful distinction be-
tween peace and armed conflict), and draws on both IHL and international 
human rights law, the latter being a body of law far more aligned with femi-
nist conceptions of protection.194 Rather than asking whether a weapon can 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, the inquiry shifted attention 
to the effects of the weapon. As a method, it unsettled traditional ideas 
around the making of international law as a right exclusively confined to 
States, thereby dispersing power.195 Feminist support for humanitarian dis-
armament proved to be well-placed. Reframing the inquiry culminated in the 
adoption of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel mines196 and the 
2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.197 And it was the recognition by 
States in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference of “the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequence of any use of nuclear weapons” that 
paved the way for further discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons to be aired over the course of following years, resulting in the adop-
tion of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.198     
Although feminist scholarship had long maintained that weapons create 
and exacerbate gendered insecurities, the concept of humanitarian disarma-
ment opened up the possibility for researchers to further interrogate the gen-
dered effects of specific weapons, spawning an increasing body of evidence 
documenting the different and often disproportionate adverse effects that 
 
194. For example, instead of inquiring whether the weapon can be deployed in a man-
ner to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, humanitarian disarmament directs 
attention to the material effects of specific weapons on the population across an extended 
temporal period. It could be argued that the effect of this reasoning is to extend the prohi-
bition of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to the civilian population. 
195. ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2007). 
196. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.  
197. Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39. 
198. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017, 57 INTERNATIONAL 











specific categories of weapons have on women due to their sex and gen-
der.199  Studies on the effects of nuclear weapons—from their use in wartime 
to testing in peacetime—exposed both the particular harms caused to 
women and girls due to their sex,200 as well as the disproportionate adverse 
harms that result due to their gender.201 Research has been undertaken in 
respect of conventional weapons and similar findings documented.202 The 
 
199. For example, SEXED PISTOLS: THE GENDERED IMPACTS OF SMALL ARMS AND 
LIGHT WEAPONS (Vanessa A. Farr et al. eds., 2009). See also GENDER PERSPECTIVES ON 
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS: REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
(Vanessa A. Farr & Kiflemariam Gebre-Wold eds., 2002). What much of this research re-
vealed was the siloed approach that had hitherto been adopted by States in developing strat-
egies to regulate arms failed to consider the gendered dimensions of weapons. As Farr ob-
serves, “although weapons proliferation is often culturally sanctioned and upheld by the 
manipulation of gender ideologies, gender goes entirely unremarked in all documents which 
were not explicitly conceived to focus on gender mainstreaming.” Vanessa A. Farr, A Gen-
dered Analysis of International Agreement on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in id. at 17.  
200. For examples of scientific studies on the physical and mental health impact of 
nuclear weapons, see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE & UNITED NATIONS 
INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS ch. 3 (2016). Studies cited found that the risk of developing and dying from solid 
cancer due to ionizing radiation exposure was nearly twice as high for women as for men 
who survived the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with many women dying from breast 
cancer. Evidence documenting the effects of nuclear weapons on pregnant women, in par-
ticular, is hugely disturbing. See, for example, the testimony of Lijon Eknilang of Rongelap 
Atoll in the Marshall Islands case before the International Court of Justice:  
 
Women on the island . . . have given birth to babies that look like blobs of jelly. Some of 
these things we carry for eight months, nine months. There are no legs, no arms, no head, 
no nothing. Other children are born who will never recognize this world or their own par-
ents. They just lie there with crooked arms and legs and never speak. Already we have seven 
such children. 
  
Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and 
to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh. Is. v. U.K.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 10, https://www.icj-
cij.org/public/files/case-related/160/160-20160311-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf.  
201. Anne G. Dimmen, Gendered Impacts: The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons 
from a Gender Perspective (International Law and Policy Institute-UN Institute for Disarma-
ment Research Paper No. 5 (2014)). 
202. Empirical research consistently shows that while men and boys generally make up 
the majority of victims, women and girls experience different and often disproportionate 
harms. For example, studies have shown that females injured by landmines are less likely to 
have access to immediate health care and therefore more likely to die from serious injuries. 












reframing of the inquiry, which has enabled the traditional limitations of time 
and space to be overcome in assessing the impact of weapons, is an approach 
more closely aligned with feminist critical scholarship, which has long been 
troubled by the fracturing of reality constituted by policy and law.203 The 
dichotomized structure of policy, entrenched principally through public in-
ternational law and IHL, was failing to capture the complex gendered effects 
of weapons that were both particular (contingent on time and space) and 
universal (producing common patterns of gendered harm). By contrast, hu-
manitarian disarmament enabled the realization that for very many women 
and girls, the harmful effects of weapons—from nuclear to SALW—are of-
tentimes no less significant in peacetime nor, for that matter, in the private 
realm. The effects are simply different. Likewise, for feminist legal scholars, 
humanitarian disarmament’s grounding in international human rights law 
provided the potential to raise alternative perspectives that had hitherto been 
suppressed, require States to consider the human cost of use and, importantly, 
introduce an additional legal route through which States could be held re-
sponsible for their actions and omissions in the field of arms control.      
The advancements secured through humanitarian disarmament have 
been greater than originally anticipated. However, by definition, there is a 
limit to what can be achieved since to focus on the effects of a weapon is to 
risk losing sight of the forces that propel the demand for weapons. The 
champions of humanitarian disarmament rely on stigmatizing the weapon to 
address demand,204 but this strategy has also resulted in entrenching the ex-
tant parallel approaches to disarmament, each side more convinced of its 
own reasoned position. What has been surfaced through this parallel process 
are the unshakeable bonds that exist among and between those States that 
have invested in weapons, transcending all other disagreements.205 Those 
 
NAL OF ERW AND MINE ACTION 32 (2013). Gender analyses have also been critical in de-
signing and delivering appropriate support for victims as is now required by the terms of 
the conventions adopted under humanitarian disarmament.  
203. As Scales elaborates, “a feminist theory and practice attempts to account for the 
fracturing of reality, and then to make reality whole again.” Scales, supra note 157, at 52. 
204. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons describes itself as the 
“international campaign to stigmatise, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.” See ICAN, 
https://www.icanw.org/ (last visited May 21, 2021).  
205. For example, see the Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, released by the permanent five members of the Security Council on Oc-













bonds are the bonds of patriarchy and militarism. Feminist engagements 
with and support for humanitarian disarmament as a strategy is likely to con-
tinue, although it is a strategy that falls short of universal and total disarma-
ment, the ambition that was embraced by feminist peace activists a century 
ago. Moreover, in an age when extraordinary levels of harm—material and 
otherwise—can be inflicted without the use of a weapon and weapon system 
as such, humanitarian disarmament, which is concerned with the effects of 
a weapon, is likely to have little reach.206   
Although initially marginalized, feminist analyses have increasingly come 
to the attention of mainstream policy-shapers in the disarmament field who 
have begun to recognize the potential that a gender analysis can provide to 
further disarmament.207 For example, in his Agenda for Disarmament, the UN 
Secretary-General recommends, 
  
all States should also incorporate gender perspectives in the development 
of national legislation and policies on disarmament and arms control, in-
cluding consideration of the gendered aspects of ownership, use and mis-
use of arms; the differentiated impacts of weapons on women and men; 
 
[W]e reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We 
firmly believe that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a 
gradual process that takes into account the international security environment. This proven 
approach to nuclear disarmament has produced tangible results, including deep reductions 
in the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons. 
 
Press Release, UK Government, P5 Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/p5-joint-
statement-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons.       
206. Jeffrey Biller & Michael Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Capabilities and Operations as 
Weapons, Means, or Methods of Warfare, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 179 (2019). 
207. A report released by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in 2006 noted 
how feminist research had “rightly observed that armament policies and the use of armed 
forces have often been influenced by misguided ideas about masculinity and strength. An 
understanding of and emancipation from this traditional perspective might help to remove 
some of the hurdles on the road to disarmament and non-proliferation.” THE WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION, WEAPONS OF TERROR: FREEING THE WORLD OF NU-
CLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS 160 (June 1, 2006). The Commission’s report 
was informed by Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill, and Sara Ruddick’s work, The Relevance of Gender 
for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 172, as was the UN Institute for Dis-
armament Research’s 2016 publication, Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons, supra note 











and the ways in which gender roles can shape arms control and disarma-
ment policies and practices.208 
  
Feminist scholarship and activism have made significant inroads in shaping 
policy and law-making at domestic and international levels in the course of 
the last three decades and “gender” is now integral to the mainstream lexi-
con.209 Yet, notwithstanding such breakthroughs, anti-war feminists remain 
 
208. The need to take account of the gender dimensions of weapons was very much 
integral to the speech delivered by the Secretary-General when launching the report:  
 
And there is also a strong gender dimension to this work. Almost universally, guns are 
infused with masculine characteristics. Men make up the overwhelming majority of the 
owners and users of firearms. Women are several times more likely to be victims of gun 
violence than perpetrators. The presence of excessive and unregulated firearms exacerbates 
gender-based violence and shores up traditional gender roles and power relations. We must 
prevent a culture of violence and bloodshed, and a cycle that is difficult to break. 
  
Guterres, supra note 1. Feminist activists are engaged in important work in the area of SALW 
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. For example, see CHRISTINE 
BUTEGWA, GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: VIEWS FROM 
AFRICA (2020). However, this work is primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with address-
ing the proliferation of weapons among non-State actors. As such, there is a risk that inte-
grating this within the Women, Security and Peace agenda as “arms control and disarma-
ment” will detract attention from the more radical feminist agenda of calling for universal 
disarmament of States.  
209. Gender mainstreaming has been official UN policy since 1997 with the adoption 
of the Economic and Social Council’s Agreed Conclusions stressing the need to incorporate 
gender perspectives into all areas of the UN’s work. Economic & Social Council, Coordi-
nation of Policies and Activities of the Specialized Agencies and Other Bodies of the United 
Nations System Related to the Following Theme: Mainstreaming the Gender Perspective 
into All Policies and Programmes in the United Nations System, U.N. Doc. E/1997/L.30 
(July 14, 1997). Gender mainstreaming can be traced to women’s activism in the early 1990s 
and the campaign to mainstream issues of women’s rights and gender equality into the in-
ternational system as a technique to overcome the problem of marginalization. Mainstream-
ing was first endorsed at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and reaf-
firmed in 1995 at the Beijing World Conference on Women. For feminist activists, the use 
of the term “gender” as distinct from “sex” by the multilateral institutions represented a 
huge breakthrough since gender expressed the reality that women’s and men’s roles and 
status are socially and culturally constructed rather than biologically determined and there-
fore could be changed. See the Secretary-General’s report, Integrating the Gender Perspec-
tive into the Work of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, which states,  
 
the term “gender” refers to the socially constructed roles of women and men that are as-












skeptical that the current trajectory will deliver fundamental change, not least 
since “gender” is still equated to “women” by too many and “gender main-
streaming” treated as an after-thought rather than a perspective that informs 
both the inquiry and solution. In addition, there remains an ever-present 
anxiety that gender mainstreaming, as Anne Orford cautions, “may mean 
that feminism ends up simply facilitating the existing projects and priorities 
of militarised economic globalization in the name of protecting and promot-
ing the interests of women.”210   
Such fears are not unwarranted. Feminist legal scholars and activists may 
have played an active role in pressing for the integration of human rights and 
a novel provision on gender-based violence into the text of the 2013 Arms 
Trade Treaty,211 but they nonetheless remained acutely aware of the down-
sides entailed in supporting a treaty that sought “to stop irresponsible arms 
trade or transfers.”212 As with the nuclear non-proliferation discourse, the 
distinction between lawful and unlawful weapons—a distinction that gener-
ally corresponds not to the weapon per se but to the status of the weapon 
bearer—has the twin effect of legitimizing the weapons-bearing State actor 
as well as the weapon itself. The Arms Trade Treaty may have been widely 
celebrated among the humanitarian community for furthering arms control, 
but critical feminists bemoaned the fact that what it concurrently does is to 
leave untouched the lawful trade in arms, diverting attention from the fact 
 
to the biological and physical characteristics of women and men. Gender roles are contin-
gent on a particular socio-economic, political and cultural context, and are affected by other 
factors, including age, race, class and ethnicity. Gender roles are learned, and vary widely 
within and between cultures. As social constructs, they can change. 
  
U.N. Secretary-General, Integrating the Gender Perspective into the Work of United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/1998/6 (Sept. 3, 1998). 
210. Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275, 283 (2002). 
211. Arms Trade Treaty, Apr. 2, 2013, 52 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 988 
(2013). Article 7(4) makes it mandatory for States Parties to take into account the risk of 
“serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and chil-
dren” in their risk assessment processes for transferring conventional weapons, ammuni-
tion, parts, or components. The recognition that there is a link between the proliferation in 
small arms/transfers in arms and gender-based violence in war and peacetime is a step for-
ward. However, in addition to the problem identified in the text above, there is also the risk 
that such a provision perpetuates the depiction of women solely as potential victims.  
212. Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, State-
ment delivered at the First Conference of the States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (Aug. 
24, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/first-conference-states-parties-arms-trade-











that the global arms trade has and continues to be dominated by the perma-
nent members of the Security Council.213   
Such paradoxes are ones that anti-war feminists, in particular, struggle 
with,214 leading them to repeatedly question the wisdom of engaging with 
existing frameworks that, by definition, appear to preclude transformation, 
making engagement futile, if not dangerous. After all, feminist scholarship 
has exposed how extant systems and structures of power, including interna-
tional law itself, are founded on relations of domination and coercion that 
are reproduced through the construction of difference, sustained and nor-
malized by false binaries and dualistic reasoning. This, in turn, begs the ques-
tion as to whether feminist theory is condemned to perpetual disappoint-
ment and, relatedly, whether productive principled critique is only possible 
from the margins. The benefits of strategic cooperation—whether with like-
minded States, the humanitarian community, or indeed with fellow feminists 
with different philosophical standpoints and priorities—may be significant, 
but anti-war feminists have long recognized that there are always costs to be 
reckoned with, even when collaborating with partners.215   
Feminist critical engagements with weapons and disarmament have pro-
vided valuable insights on the workings of patriarchy and militarism through 
gender regimes and of the complex ways in which gender functions to as-
cribe meaning to weapons beyond their material form which, in turn, fuel 
demand. In parallel, feminist scholars have expended considerable energy 
countering false narratives that equate weapons with security, not least the 
claim repetitively voiced by nuclear-weapon States that such weapons contrib-
ute to peace and security. 216 Although this work is finding its way into policy 
 
213. This does not mean that critical feminist scholars oppose the Arms Trade Treaty 
but simply that feminist engagements with international law are never without problems. See 
also Maurer, id. The advantages of having such a treaty are enormous, not least since it creates 
opportunities to hold governments to account whether through advocacy or through litiga-
tion. That said, the terms of the treaty have been drafted in a manner that does not make 
litigation easy. See, e.g., CAAT’S Legal Challenge, CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE, 
https://caat.org.uk/homepage/stop-arming-saudi-arabia/caats-legal-challenge/ (last vis-
ited May 21, 2021).  
214. The paradox of law reform strategies is that in insisting on the inclusion of 
measures that take account of the specificity of women, sexual difference is reintroduced. 
215. Carol Cohn, Mainstreaming Gender in UN Security Policy: A Path to Political Transfor-
mation? 12 (Boston Consortium on Gender, Security and Human Rights Working Paper No. 
204 (2004)), https://genderandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/mainstreaming_gen-
der_in_un_security_policy-_a_path_to_political_transformation_0.pdf. 












and law-making, there remains a deep reluctance not only among States but 
non-governmental partners and fellow academics217 to fully embrace a gen-
der analysis. Not to do so is, by default, to accept an eclipsed view and to 




Did men say, “After you, sir” as to disarmament? If so, let us women say, “Follow 
me.” 
Gertrud Baer, 1924218 
 
In describing the present architecture of arms control law as “fragmented” 
and lamenting the fact that no “system for the regulation of armaments” as 
set forth in Article 26 of the UN Charter has been developed, mainstream 
international legal scholars have called for a “more coherent approach” to 
rejuvenate arms control and disarmament, including adopting a framework 
treaty on arms regulation with specific treaties, protocols, codes of conduct, 
and other implementation instruments providing necessary detail.219 That 
 
 
The Prime Minister, when replying to a letter from Mr Gorbachev about the Soviet pro-
posals of January 1986, made clear the Government’s view that nuclear weapons at present 
make an essential contribution to preserving peace and stability and that East and West will 
continue to rely on them in their deterrent role for the foreseeable future. 
  
George Younger, UK Secretary of State for Defence, Draft Statement on the Defence Es-
timates 1986, ¶ 212 (Mar. 26, 1986) (on file with The National Archives, Kew, CAB 
129/221/4). This rationale normalizes and explains the dominance of the theory and prac-
tice of nuclear deterrence, which has been castigated by anti-war feminists for being nothing 
other than “a fiction.” Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 178, at 15–16. There is now a consider-
able body of academic literature unpacking the concept of nuclear deterrence. See, e.g., Nigel, 
supra note 176, at 254–58; Stuart Casey-Maslen, The Status of Nuclear Deterrence Under Interna-
tional Law in Light of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 21 YEARBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 23 (2018); Anne Harrington, Power, Violence, and Nuclear 
Weapons, 4 CRITICAL STUDIES ON SECURITY 91 (2016); GEORGE SCHULTZ & JAMES 
GOODBY, THE WAR THAT MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT. DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR DETER-
RENCE (2015); MICHAEL QUINLAN, THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PRINCIPLES, 
PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS (2009).  
217. COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW, supra note 148, at 12. 
218. 4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 59, at 111. 
219. COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW, supra note 148, at 12. 
See also Dieter Fleck, Arms Control and Disarmament Law: Its Role in Addressing New Security 











arms control and disarmament law is a fragmented body of law is hardly 
surprising. 
Multilateral institutional bodies may have been accorded the right—or 
indeed the responsibility—to develop systems for the regulation of arma-
ments, but States have repeatedly ensured that the right to develop, produce, 
retain, transfer, and use weapons are sovereign rights protected by interna-
tional law. After all, weapons are the very means by which States have come 
into being. And it is this history that plays into and fosters the assumption that 
weapons are necessary to the continued survival of the State. This reasoning 
also serves to normalize the interweaving of the machinery of warfare into 
the very fabric of the State. These beliefs are further reinforced by the sym-
bolic value of weapons as a defining feature of State sovereignty; weapons 
make States fully sovereign. Stripping a defeated enemy State of its weapons 
is a deeply symbolic gendered act: it deprives a State of full sovereignty, and, 
in that process, a relationship of domination and oppression is imposed.220 
This same pattern of symbolism is reproduced at the inter-personal level, 
where the legitimate possession and use of weapons are often treated as a 
measure of being fully [hu]man. 
Fragmentation aside, the field of disarmament and arms control is 
plagued by terminological ambiguity combined with technocratic detail.221 
Neither “disarmament” nor “arms control” are static terms. On a narrow 
reading disarmament is understood as the elimination of the means by which 
nations wage war, whereas, used as a generic term, it encompasses other 
measures including limitation, reduction, and non-proliferation. Likewise, 
arms control can be read narrowly within its Cold War context to denote 
measures to limit the nuclear arms race in contrast to the far more expansive 
contemporary usage to include agreement to freeze, limit, or abolish specific 
categories of weapons.222 If disarmament and arms control are indeed fluid 
 
220. In 1919, WILPF’s activists instinctively recognized that unilateral disarmament 
symbolized a stripping of sovereign rights and the imposition of a hierarchical relationship 
precluding the possibility of peace, which cannot be founded on relations of oppression.  
221. STUART CASEY-MASLEN & TOBIAS VESTNER, A GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL DIS-
ARMAMENT LAW 15 (2019).  
222. Schelling and Halperin define arms control (in the context of Cold War bilateral 
efforts) as “all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest 
of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and 
economic costs of being prepared for it.” THOMAS SCHELLING & MORTON HALPERIN, 













terms, one might also ask what precisely is envisaged by “general and com-
plete disarmament under effective international control” in the contempo-
rary setting. Typically, opacity is countered by repetition as though repetition 
equates to elucidation. Lack of legal specificity is attacked for being utopian 
yet concurrently claimed to further strategic interests. Technocratic detail di-
verts attention from what is silenced. But that, perhaps, is precisely the point.    
Critical feminist international lawyers are less sanguine about the poten-
tial for international law, as currently interpreted and applied, to deliver rad-
ical change. Greater clarity and less fragmentation may indeed facilitate some 
progress, but if feminist engagements have illuminated anything, it is that 
until the drivers of weapons proliferation are disbanded, there is little chance 
of making real progress on “general and complete disarmament under effec-
tive international control” let alone “universal and total disarmament,” un-
derstood as a far more radical ambition that entails the wholesale dismantling 
of the machinery of war, public and private. In contrast to early feminist 
peace activists, who viewed the emerging regime of international law as the 
means by which an international order committed to peace, equality, and 
justice could be secured,223 a century of feminist engagements with interna-
tional law has dampened expectations and injected doubt,224 and sometimes 
 
arms control refers to unilateral measures, bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as 
informal regimes (“politically binding” documents, “soft” law) between States to limit or 
reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations in order to achieve stable mili-
tary balances and thus diminish tensions and the possibility of large-scale armed conflict. 
 
Guido den Dekker, The Effectiveness of International Supervision in Arms Control Law, 9 JOURNAL 
OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 315, 316 (2004).  
223. See, in particular, resolutions adopted by WILPF during the first congress. 1915 
CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 36. 
224. See, for example, Kapur, who writes “in rereading/deconstructing the colonial 
legacies as well as the gender and sexual hierarchies that constitute human rights, [critical] 
scholarship has exposed how this project is incapable of meeting its promise of delivering 
freedom to the disenfranchised.” RATNA KAPUR, GENDER, ALTERITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: FREEDOM IN A FISHBOWL 8 (2018). Anghie likewise asks “if . . . the colonial en-
counter, with all its exclusions and subordinations, shaped the very foundations of interna-
tional law, then grave questions must arise as to whether and how it is possible for the post-
colonial world to construct a new international law that is liberated from these colonial 
origins.” ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNA-











remorse,225 in spite of the normative gains.226 The law’s violence is all too 
visible, as is its role in consolidating a hierarchical international order 
founded on military strength through its greatest achievement to date, the 
UN Charter. The prospect of having an equal part in shaping a shared future 
promised by international law even though integrated into the text of the 
Charter remains elusive, most notably in fields coded “masculine.” The very 
fact that women are still under-represented and often deliberately excluded 
from institutional fora concerned with weapons and disarmament decision-
making, forty years after entry into force of CEDAW, is a catastrophic failure of 
State responsibility. That in itself says something.  
The obligation on States to ensure women’s equal representation and 
participation in political and public life, including within international arenas, 
has not been respected227 despite the insistence on the part of the CEDAW 
 
225. In the context of nuclear weapons, it is difficult not to conclude that every treaty 
regime—apart from the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—instantiates and 
reinforces the exceptionalism of nuclear-weapon States. 
226. While there has been progress over the decades, “the problem of challenging a 
form of power without accepting its own terms of reference and hence losing the battle 
before it has begun” remains a constant anxiety. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE 
POWER OF LAW 5 (1989). 
227. Article 7 of CEDAW requires States parties, 
 
to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political 
and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with 
men, the right: (a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election 
to all publicly elected bodies; (b) To participate in the formulation of government policy 
and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions 
at all levels of government; (c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and asso-
ciations concerned with the public and political life of the country. 
  
CEDAW, supra note 149, art. 7. For global statistics for January 2021, see Facts and Figures: 
Women’s Leadership and Political Participation, UN WOMEN, https://www.un-
women.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures (last 
updated Jan. 15, 2021). See also Rachel B. Vogelstein & Alexandra Bro, Women’s Power Index, 
CFR, https://www.cfr.org/article/womens-power-index (last updated Mar. 29, 2021). Ar-
ticle 8 of CEDAW requires States to take “all appropriate measures to ensure to women, 
on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their 
Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of international or-
ganizations.” For States not party to CEDAW, Articles 2 and 25 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights apply. International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights arts. 2, 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Paragraph 134 of the Platform for Ac-
tion also emphasizes that “the equal access and full participation of women in power struc-












Committee that Article 8 requires States to “ensure the presence of women 
at all levels and in all areas of international affairs . . . [and] they be included 
in economic and military matters, in both multilateral and bilateral diplo-
macy, and in official delegations to international and regional confer-
ences.”228 Little has changed in the twenty-five years since the Committee 
first drew attention to the fact that women not only comprised a minority 
but were concentrated in lower-level positions within the UN system and at 
the regional level in economic, political, and military structures. The First 
Committee of the General Assembly has had only a single female chair in 
seventy-two sessions.229 That States are not taking all appropriate measures, 
including enactment of domestic legislation and temporary measures as set 
forth in Article 4(1) of CEDAW to dismantle structural and systemic gender 
discrimination, is all too evident. The Committee’s observations in 1997 that 
“many crucial decisions on global issues, such as peacemaking and conflict 
resolution, military expenditure and nuclear disarmament, development and 
the environment, foreign aid and economic restructuring, are taken with lim-
ited participation of women,”230 still apply in 2021. 
Contemporary discussions on why women should be included are diver-
sions that play into patriarchal privilege.231 A century ago, women peace ac-
tivists may have felt that justifying their right to a “seat at the disarmament 
 
are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.” Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action, supra note 138, ¶ 134, at 57. The fact that the theme of 65th session 
of the UN’s Commission on the Status of Women was “women’s full and effective partici-
pation and decision-making in public life” is evidence of State failure. See CSW65 (2021), 
UN WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/csw65-2021 (last visited May 21, 2021).  
228. See UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 23: Political and Public Life ¶ 35 (1997), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx [here-
inafter General Recommendation 23].  
229. In 2010 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/69 on Women, disarmament, 
non-proliferation and arms control, calling on States to promote the “equitable representation of 
women in all decision-making processes with regard to matters related to disarmament, non-
proliferation and arms control.” G.A. Res. 65/69, ¶ 1 (Jan. 13, 2011). Since then, the As-
sembly has adopted a further four resolutions.  
230. General Recommendation No. 23, supra note 228, ¶ 39.  
231. In particular, claims that emphasize women’s skills as “peace-builders” is a high-
risk strategy that risks playing into essentialist narratives that are likely to be hugely counter-
productive in the long term. Moreover, such strategies undermine the normative gains made. 
The predominant belief among earlier generations that women, by their nature, biology, and 
maternal instinct were more moral, nurturing, humane, and pacific than men and therefore 












table” was necessary, but the site of current scrutiny must be on why States 
are not taking all appropriate measures to ensure equal and meaningful par-
ticipation. It is axiomatic that equal representation is meaningless without 
the power to shape and influence outcomes.232 Nevertheless, without the 
commitment to transform the structures and systems of power that give rise 
to the harm in the first place, even the power to shape and influence is mean-
ingless. Reform to increase women’s participation and the improvement of 
the social status of women within existing social structures without address-
ing the gender systems upon which political, economic, social, and cultural 
structures, institutions, and systems are founded will only reinforce systems 
of domination predicated on coercion and violence.233 The failure by States 
to adopt measures to eliminate the causes of sexism—or for that matter all 
other axes of difference such as racism and classism—is to perpetuate and 
normalize social orderings founded on structures and systems of domination 
in which weapons as a manifestation of that coercive power play a critical 
role, whether deployed or not. Meaningful progress on disarmament cannot 
be achieved without demystifying the symbolic value attached to all weapons 
and eliminating the gender regimes that create and sustain the demand for 
 
into public activities, but such essentialist claims were soon discarded as damaging to secur-
ing equality more broadly.  
232. Otto, Holding up Half the Sky, supra note 141, at 7.  
233. Cynthia Cockburn, Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War, 12 INTERNA-











them. Dislodging and reversing legal legacies establishing a gendered sym-
bolic link between weapons, rights,234 citizenship,235 political power,236 and 
the cultural practices that knit together weapons and gender identities is 
hampered by the fact that existing international law provides little assistance, 
often limited by its own structure. For example, CEDAW’s preamble may 
register the connections between “international peace and security,” “general 
and complete disarmament including nuclear disarmament under strict and 
effective international control,” and “equality,” but the most that the con-
vention can do is to engage with weapons and disarmament through the 
prism of non-discrimination. This is not to diminish the role played by the 
CEDAW Committee, which has pressed for the need for a gender perspec-
tive to be incorporated into weapons treaties.237 The Committee has repeat-
edly reminded States that conventional arms, especially small arms, including 
diverted arms from the legal trade, can have a direct or indirect effect on 
women as victims of conflict-related sexual violence, as victims of domestic 
 
234. Historically, the duty to bear arms was intimately linked to the right to political 
participation, with the former obligation imposed exclusively on men in times of war. 
235. Citizenship rights have often been founded on military service and the obligation 
to bear arms. For example, Rosika Schwimmer was denied US citizenship because she re-
fused to answer affirmatively to question twenty-two of the Oath of Allegiance: “If neces-
sary are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?” Beth Wenger, Radical Politics 
in a Reactionary Age: The Unmaking of Rosika Schwimmer, 1914-1930, 2 JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S 
HISTORY 66, 86 (1990). According to Wenger, in their pleadings before the Supreme Court, 
the Department of Justice urged the Court to refuse citizenship because,  
 
she does not believe in other people bearing arms in defense of the country . . . [and] does 
not believe in organized government as we understand it because organized government 
cannot exist without military defense. She would see the Constitution and the government 
of the U.S. destroyed by an enemy rather than have one citizen lift a finger in their defense. 
If every citizen believed as she does and acted as she will, we would have no constitution 
and no government. 
  
Id. at 87–88.   
236. Political power is nearly always linked directly to the bearing of arms and status as 
a belligerent. For example, Jane Addams, commenting on the decision of the United States 
to enter the war observed, “as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the 
United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but that if he remained the representative 
of a neutral country he could at best only ‘call through a crack in the door.’” ADDAMS, 
PEACE AND BREAD, supra note 34, at 64.   
237. Statement of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women on the Need for a Gender Perspective in the Text of the Arms Trade Treaty 












violence, and also as protestors or actors in resistance movements.238 It has 
called attention to the fact that the proliferation of arms and ammunition 
perpetuate and facilitate gender-based violence and atrocities confronted by 
women in peace and conflict;239 and has reminded States of their responsi-
bility to address the gendered impact of international transfers of arms, es-
pecially small and illicit arms, including through the implementation of the 
ATT.240   
More recently, feminist international lawyers have turned to the right to 
peace as a potential site through which to further disarmament.241 After all, 
disarmament has long been an integral component to conceptions of peace, 
even if understood as nothing other than the absence of war. To frame peace 
as an enforceable positive right—not simply as an inter-State obligation—
would open the door to advancing disarmament and transformative 
change.242 The view that disarmament is a core dimension of the right to 
peace was also shared by the UN Human Rights Council Advisory Commit-
tee, which was charged with producing a draft text on the Declaration on the 
 
238. Id. But see U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
Concluding Observations on the Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of Eritrea, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. 
Doc. CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/5 (Mar. 12, 2015); U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth and Fifth 
Periodic Reports of Switzerland, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHE/CO/4-5 (Nov. 
25, 2016); U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Conclud-
ing Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports for France, ¶ 23, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/Co/7-8 (July 25, 2016).  
239. Statement of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, supra note 237. U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Con-
flict and Post-conflict Situations, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Nov. 1, 2013) [here-
inafter General Recommendation No. 30]. 
240. General Recommendation No. 30, supra note 239. 
241. The right to peace is recognized by the Organization of African Unity. See African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 23, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIALS 58 (1982) (entered into force 
Oct. 21, 1986). It is also recognized by the African Union. See Protocol to the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Right on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 10, July 1, 2003, 
(entered into force Nov. 25, 2005). In XYZ v. Republic of Benin, the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights found Benin to have violated the claimant’s right to peace and security. 
See XYZ v. Republic of Benin, Judgment, ¶ 137, App. No. 059/2019, Afr. Ct. Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (Nov. 27, 2020).  
242. Significantly, such a recognition would extend the range of available strategies 











Right to Peace.243 As the Advisory Committee noted, “the right to full dis-
armament must be understood to be part of the right of peoples to live in 
peace. The right to disarmament should be a component of the right of peo-
ples to peace as well as part of the right to international solidarity.”244 Yet, 
the final text adopted, reduced from an original fourteen operative articles 
to a mere four plus a saving clause, makes no reference to disarmament or 
human security.245 Adopted by the General Assembly in 2017, the Peace 
Declaration stands as a reminder of what has been redacted, silenced, and 
situated beyond scrutiny and State responsibility.246   
The Peace Declaration is far from being the only instance where dis-
armament has been taken off the agenda of a multilateral normative initiative 
pertaining to peace.247 Attempts by anti-war feminists to include disarma-
ment in the final text of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security was met with resistance, and the decision not to pursue the 
 
243. U.N. Human Rights Council, Progress Report of the Human Rights Council Advisory 
Committee on the Right of Peoples to Peace, §§ IV(B), (C), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/39 (Apr. 1, 
2011).    
244. Id. ¶ 30 (see also the “proposed standards”). 
245. Perhaps most regressively, with the insertion of the word “enjoy,” the right of 
peoples to peace was recast as a “right to enjoy peace.” See G.A. Res. 71/189, art. 1, Decla-
ration on the Right to Peace (Feb. 2, 2017).  
246. While the resolution rightly refers to racism, racial discrimination, and xenophobia 
as obstacles to peace, disappointingly, what was missing from the original text was any ref-
erences to the harmful consequences of sexism, homophobia, misogyny, and patriarchy. 
Christine Chinkin, Women and the Right to Peace, LSE (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/04/21/women-and-the-right-to-peace/.   
247. It is noteworthy that the UN’s most ambitious program for global change, the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals, is silent on disarmament. The effort on the part of 
the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs to link Goal 16, “to promote peaceful and inclusive 
societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” to its work only serves to bring to light 
that disarmament is missing from the agenda. Izumi Nakamitsu, UN High Representative 
for Disarmament Affairs, Advancing Disarmament within the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Devel-
opment, UN CHRONICLE (Aug. 2018), https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/advanc-
ing-disarmament-within-2030-agenda-sustainable-development. Likewise, the most that the 
Secretary-General can claim is 
 
excessive spending on weapons drains resources for sustainable development. It is incom-
patible with creating stable, inclusive societies, strong institutions, effective governance and 
democracy, and a culture of respect for human rights. My initiative will have a strong basis 
also in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the world’s blueprint for peace and 
prosperity on a healthy planet. 
  











matter was a high price to pay for women’s admission into the realms of 
Security Council decision-making.248 The deal struck was a regressive com-
prise that, in effect, reinscribed the gendered boundaries that anti-war femi-
nists had fought against throughout the UN Decade for Women and had 
torn down, albeit partially, in Beijing.249    
Twenty-five years after Beijing, the barriers have been re-erected. The 
political declaration by States to commemorate the anniversary is silent on 
disarmament,250 in stark contrast to the Secretary-General’s report released 
three months earlier reviewing progress and noting how women’s activism 
in the intervening period had “focused on the links between achieving gen-
der equality and peace, reducing military expenditure, controlling the availa-
bility of armaments and promoting non-violent forms of conflict resolu-
tion.”251 While the report recognizes the significant contributions made by 
feminist activism to advance disarmament through treaties, it situates these 
achievements in the broader context and concludes:   
 
the implementation of global commitments on disarmament has been sty-
mied by increased military spending, the continued spread of small arms 
 
248. As Otto laments:  
 
Perhaps Resolution 1325’s most instructive omission, when it comes to selectivity, is its 
failure to make any reference to general disarmament, a long-standing goal of women’s 
peace movements . . . . So, the price of the Council’s endorsement of women’s participation 
in peacemaking and peace-building, and its increased accessibility to the NGO Working 
Group, is the silencing of feminist critiques of militarism and the failure to recognise the 
“inextricable” link between gender equality and peace. 
  
Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law Over the Last 
Decade, 10 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 21 (2009). Ironically, if that 
was indeed the “trade-off,” it was a poor one given that women still continue to be excluded 
from peacemaking and peace-building. Cohn, Mainstreaming Gender, supra note 215. 
249. Although some commentators have suggested that the Women, Peace and Secu-
rity resolutions, including S.C. Res.1325 (Oct. 31, 2000), S.C. Res.1820 (June 19, 2008), S.C. 
Res.1888 (2009), S.C. Res.1889 (Sept. 30, 2009), S.C. Res.2106 (June 24, 2013), S.C. Res. 
2122 (Oct. 18, 2013), and S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019), speak to disarmament, the refer-
ences contained therein concern the disarmament of non-State actors rather than States.   
250. U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, Draft Resolution Submitted by the 
Chair of the Commission, Political Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anni-
versary of the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/2020/L.1 (Mar. 
2, 2020). 
251. U.N. Secretary-General, Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of the Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action and the Outcomes of the Twenty-third Special Session of the General As-











and light weapons, the development of new weapons and growing tensions 
between rivals armed with nuclear weapons (S/2019/800). Global military 
spending nearly doubled from 1995 levels to $1.82 trillion in 2018. . . . Such 
spending deprives national budgets of resources for social spending, which 
is critical to achieving gender equality. In about one third of countries for 
which data are available, government military spending is higher than 
health expenditure.252 
 
The passage is a reminder of the chasm between legal undertakings and 
State practice. Perhaps more disturbing, it is a testament of how what should 
be entirely unreasonable has been made routine and banal. Two weeks after 
the release of the report, news began to emerge from Wuhan of cases of 
“viral pneumonia.” Calls by the Secretary-General for ceasefires went un-
heeded while, throughout 2020, States invested in the production of arms 
took steps to categorize those in the defense sector as “essential workers” 
and thus exempt from lockdown restrictions. As governments took 
measures (some more than others) to mitigate the effects of the virus, the 
vernacular of militarism took over.253  
Where does this leave feminist efforts to advance universal disarmament 
in 2021 and beyond?  
After four years of inter-State political instability, many welcomed the 
new Biden administration in Washington and the prospect of a return to 
normalcy, predictability, stability, and reason. Multilateralism and interna-
tional law appear to be back on the agenda with signs that the administration 
is developing an “ambitious agenda to negotiate new arms control treaties” 
and its intention to review the “nuclear modernization portfolio” introduced 
by the previous administration that was expected to cost half a trillion dollars 
over the next decade alone.254 Biden’s decision to extend New START just 
days before the treaty was due to expire was read as going beyond the terms 
of the treaty, a symbolic gesture to re-engage in dialogue coming not long 
after the expiry of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty amidst ac-
cusations of breaches and the collapse of the arms control system that had 
 
252. Id.      
253. Christine Chinkin & Madeleine Rees, Our Male Leaders Declared War on the Pandemic. 
Our Response Must Match That, LSE (May 11, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/ 
05/11/our-male-leaders-declared-war-on-the-pandemic-our-response-must-match-that/. 
254. Bryan Bender, “This is Going to be Quite a Show”: Biden’s Arms Control Team Eyes 












existed since the Cold War.255 It is too early to tell whether the return to a 
more liberal agenda may entail the resurrection of an ambition articulated 
over a decade ago with a shift from the language of nuclear non-proliferation 
to reduction and disarmament.256 For the moment, at least, the priority ap-
pears to be on non-proliferation.257 However, what the return to a liberal 
 
255. In February 2019 the United States suspended its observance of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, pointing to evidence that Russia was developing and deploy-
ing SSC-8/9M729 cruise missiles. The failure of countermeasures by the United States re-
sulted in the United States formally withdrawing from the treaty in August, citing a “material 
breach” on the part of Russia. The collapse of the treaty marked a serious erosion of the 
system of nuclear arms control that had existed since end of Cold War and which had re-
sulted in the complete elimination of U.S. and Russian nuclear and conventional ground-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. 
256. In a speech on April 5, 2009, President Obama declared:  
 
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and 
security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached 
quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. . . . . Now, let me 
describe to you the trajectory we need to be on. First, the United States will take concrete 
steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we 
will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to 
do the same. . . . To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. . . . And this will set the stage for further 
cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. To achieve a 
global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue 
U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. . . . And to cut off the building 
blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the 
production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. 
 
President Barack Obama, Remarks at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barac 
k-obama-prague-delivered. 
257. Although in his first foreign policy statement on February 4, 2021, President Biden 
announced the end to “all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, 
including relevant arms sales” he then added an important caveat: “At the same time, Saudi 
Arabia faces missile attacks, UAV strikes, and other threats from Iranian-supplied forces in 
multiple countries. We’re going to continue to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its 
sovereignty and its territorial integrity and its people.” President Joe Biden, America’s Place 
in the World, Remarks at the U.S. Department of State Headquarters (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-
by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/ (emphasis added). In other words, as 
elaborated by Alex Ward, although it is likely (albeit not certain) that the United States will 
no longer provide Saudi Arabia with precision-guided munitions nor the UAE (a coalition 
partner) with F-35 fighters, the new administration has reserved the right to provide its allies 












agenda is likely to involve is the resumption of the program of advancing 
disarmament through incremental steps; in other words, a commitment to 
partial disarmament.258 Feminist support for partial measures has been equiv-
ocal. It has oscillated between a pragmatism (something is surely better than noth-
ing) that is simultaneously plagued by a deep disquiet (rooted in the 
knowledge that partial measures conceal the very deferment of the ultimate 
goal) and an idealism that risks exclusion.259 Either way, the return to nor-
malcy, to the status quo ante, is precisely what anti-war feminists fear the most. 
What went before led us precisely to where we are today: that is the catastro-
phe.260   
As for the existing multilateral institutions, there is little hope that any 
meaningful progress on advancing general and complete disarmament will 
materialize in the foreseeable future. The view expressed by the Secretary-
General that “since the beginning of the twenty-first century, multilateral 
disarmament institutions have remained in a state of stagnation. These bod-
ies do not seem to function as an essential part of what should be the integral 
architecture of peace and security”261 is shared by those within and outside 
the UN. The Conference on Disarmament—the only multilateral negotiating 
body for disarmament—has been paralyzed for at least the last twenty-four 
years. Its last major achievement—agreeing to the text of a comprehensive 
 
the 2018 nuclear agreement with Iran, abandoned under the previous administration and 
strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia. Alex Ward, Biden’s Announcement on Ending US Support for 
the War in Yemen, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.vox.com/22268082/biden-
yemen-war-saudi-state-speech.  
258. Every previous major multilateral arms control treaty has, in its preamble, claimed 
to represent one more step towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. 
See the preambles of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, 1977 Environmental Mod-
ification Convention; 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention; 1992 Chemical 
Weapons Convention; 1996 Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and 1996 African Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone.   
259. For example, at its 4th Congress in 1924, WILPF adopted a resolution stating:  
 
Believing that work towards disarmament in different counties should not wait until general 
disarmament can be realized, though general disarmament is our goal, we welcome with 
profound satisfaction the suggestion of the President of the United States in regard to the 
calling of an International Conference to deal with limitation of armaments. 
  
4TH CONGRESS REPORT, supra note 51, at 138. 
260. WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 253–64 (Harry Zohn trans., Hannah Arendt 
ed., Schocken Books, 1969) (1955) (setting forth Benjamin’s theses on the philosophy of 
history). 











nuclear test ban treaty—has not come into force.262 The wisdom of contin-
ued engagement with bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament has 
been a cause of constant angst for anti-war feminists. But, in 2015, a century 
after first demanding to be included within the multilateral institution spaces 
of disarmament, WILPF announced that it had decided to cease engaging 
with the Conference on Disarmament.263 The strategy is not without some 
risk given the shrinking spaces for political activism. But it also raises im-
portant questions for anti-war feminists about the value of operating within 
institutional spaces that are no longer fully committed to the ambitions upon 
which they were originally founded.   
Amidst this somewhat bleak landscape a window of opportunity has 
been opened for anti-war feminists to pursue a transformative disarmament 
agenda and to do so from the site of power. In September 2020, in the run-
up to the twentieth anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, 
the Secretary-General released his annual report on Women, Peace and Se-
curity.264 Buried within section III on “Building and sustaining peace: linking 
the women and peace and security agenda to achieve the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development” is subsection A, entitled “Disarmament and arms 
control.” The section opens with the simple yet subversive assertion that 
disarmament is both vital to the achievement of the 2030 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals and “central to realizing the women and peace and security 
agenda.”265 The report continues: 
 
Disarmament is core to what was originally envisioned for the women and 
peace and security agenda. It also features prominently in the section on 
women and armed conflict of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, under the strategic objective and related commitments to reduce 
excessive military expenditures and control the availability of armaments. 
 
262. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (1996) (not yet in force) (adopted by the General 
Assembly as Resolution A/RES/50/245 (Sept. 10, 1996)).  
263. See WILPF Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on International Women's Day 
2015, REACHING CRITICAL WILL, https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-
news/9559-wilpf-statement-to-the-conference-on-disarmament-on-international-women-
s-day-2015 (last visited May 21, 2021) (WILPF’s statement on its decision to cease engaging 
with the Conference on Disarmament).  
264. U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security, U.N. Doc. S/2020/946 (Sept. 
25, 2020). 











However, the connections between the disarmament agenda and the 
women and peace and security agenda are yet to be fully explored.266  
 
Although the report falls short of referring explicitly to “general and com-
plete disarmament,” the concept sits there in the references to the Beijing 
Declaration and in the reminder of the “fiftieth anniversary of the entry into 
force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” and call 
for “a strong recommitment to the elimination of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.”267 Thus, while Resolution 1325 may have appeared to foreclose the 
possibility for debate on disarmament and thereby preclude it from being a 
potential site from which to advance disarmament, the Secretary-General’s 
report has re-situated it into the agenda where it has always belonged and 
under the first of the four pillars, conflict prevention. Whether anti-war fem-
inists who have consistently maintained that disarmament is a precondition 
to both peace and security will take advantage of this “invitation” remains to 
be seen. The Secretary-General’s understanding of the scope of the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda certainly corresponds with the analysis laid out in 
the 2015 Global Study commissioned by the Security Council in preparation 
for the high-level review.268 Authored by Radhika Coomaraswamy, former 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, with the support of a sev-
enteen-member high-level advisory group, the report took a more expansive 
view of prevention to include conflict prevention, in contradistinction to the 
more narrow interpretation of the prevention pillar adopted by States.269 
Conflict prevention, according to the Global Study, required States to “ad-
dress the underlying causes of war and violence. . . . They include efforts to 
address structural inequality and violence, promote human rights and human 
security, and engage in demilitarization, disarmament and reduction in 
spending on armaments.”270  
In the six years since the release of the report, States have shown little 
appetite to embrace this view. Admittedly, the very construction of the 
Women, Peace and Security agenda functions as a legal obstacle to the extent 
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268. S.C. Res. 2122, ¶ 16 (Oct. 18, 2013). See also RADHIKA COOMARASWAMY, PRE-
VENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING PEACE: A GLOBAL STUDY ON 
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(2015). 
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that it is grounded in international legal instruments that are concerned with 
regulating State conduct in respect of individuals and or groups. The opera-
tive paragraphs in Resolution 1325 cite key IHL instruments, refugee law, 
international human rights law, including CEDAW and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and international criminal law; in other words, the 
Security Council has limited its engagement with “women” through their 
identity rather than through issues that shape their lives. While weapons de-
termine the context within which lives are lived, they are cast by international 
law as a matter that falls within the exclusive concern of inter-State relations.    
This need not remain the case. International law is a regime constructed 
by States. The dichotomized structure adopted is simply the reflection of 
political choices. In adopting 1325, the Security Council situated the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda squarely within international law in recalling the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter and its own legal responsibility 
under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.271 
2020—which marked the 75th anniversary of the UN and the 20th anniversary 
of the Women, Peace and Security agenda—should have provided States 
with an opportunity to critically reflect on their record of achievements in 
light of the stated ambition of the Charter and to recognize that little has 
been achieved in advancing universal and complete disarmament.    
In his Agenda for Disarmament report, the Secretary-General concludes 
with a quote from his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, who cautioned that 
“in this field, as we well know, a standstill does not exist; if you do not go 
forward, you do go backward.” If anything can be gleaned from a century of 
feminist peace activism, it is that accepting the status quo has never been an 
option. Today, the challenges confronted seem more daunting than ever, 
whether in the shape of meaningful participation or countering cultures of 
militarism272 and patriarchy that sustain the demand for weapons and that, 
in turn, serve to mold our identities and our communities. Critical feminists 
remain all too aware of the need to constantly draw attention to the insidious 
language of militarism and of gender relentlessly invoked by political figures 
in the public sphere273 and popular culture if those chains are to be broken. 
Exposing myths, false narratives (“every government defends its participation in the 
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arms race as necessary to guard its national security. But this is an illusion”274) and 
distinctions that are repeatedly recited as though the difference between the 
two is self-evident (what distinguishes offensive from defensive weapons?) are under-
takings that demand constant commitment. None of this work is new. Fem-
inist strategies will alter over time, as does thinking. But what has remained 
constant is the belief that a sustainable peace cannot be attained without uni-
versal and total disarmament, which can only be secured through fundamen-
tal transformative change in the existing order at inter-personal, intra-State, 




De Martens was right to describe the Utopians as “the most dangerous ene-
mies of the progress of international law.” What he instinctively knew was 
that a world in which international law delivered universal disarmament, eter-
nal peace, and the abolition of war was one in which power—including the 
power to make and shape international law—no longer rested in the hands 
of a privileged few. It would be a world radically transformed and one in 
which power was equally distributed, among States and among people. 
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